Editorial: Individuality

ARTICLES

Eruditio Vision

The vision of the Journal complements and enhances the World Academy's focus on global perspectives in the generation of knowledge from all fields of legitimate inquiry. The Journal also mirrors the World Academy's specific focus and mandate which is to consider the social consequences and policy implications of knowledge in the broadest sense. The vision of the Journal encompasses major challenges facing global society and seeks to examine these issues from an interdisciplinary, multi-method and value guided perspective.

Editorial: Individuality

We were pleased to introduce *ERUDITIO,* the new electronic journal of the World Academy of Art & Science, to you in June this year. We indicated then that this first issue of *ERUDITIO* is dedicated to the theme of individuality viewed from a multidisciplinary focus with implications of social consequences and policy possibilities. The papers emerged from a web seminar of the Academy on "Individuality" as well as a conference on "Humanities and the Contemporary World" organized by the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts in June. Issue 1 will eventually contain approximately sixteen (16) papers, which will be released in four (4) parts. Links are provided so that you may also access the individual papers online.

Issue 1 – Part 2: Individuality

Study of Individuality and Social Evolution in Literature
    - by Janani Harish
A History of the Individual in European Culture
    - by Augusto Forti
Individuality, Humanism & Human Rights
    - by Winston Nagan and Aitza Haddad
Secretariat of the Soul and Certainty
    - by Orio Giarini

Janani Harish has made an important contribution to the understanding of individuality with a focus on literature. She points out that scientific objectivity in the description of the individual in social process may miss many crucial psychological and social elements of consciousness, which are central to a deeper understanding of the dynamics of social change or social conflict. Harish presents a powerful case for the role of the narrative (in this instance, literature) for a much deeper understanding of the role of the narrative and its influence on social dynamics for good or evil. Her illustration, drawn from the work of Jane Austen, conventionally considered somewhat apolitical, demonstrates that Austen's deft use of the narrative is brilliantly deployed to explore the interplay of individual personality and class conscious barriers. Austen demonstrates that the individuation of love provides a tool for generating a degree of permeability in otherwise rigid class barriers. She implicitly suggests that in a state whose class lines are rigid there is the prospect of violent resistance, as in the example of France. Harish establishes the point that creative consciousness is a powerful tool when deployed in the form of an effective narrative.

Augusto Forti provides an insightful "history" of the individual in the context of European culture. He cautions us that cross culturally there are great similarities in the conception of individuality. He suggests this to implicitly endorse the view that the emergence of individuality in Europe is not necessarily an exclusive parochial European idea. Forti notes that the political culture and structure of European history, dominated by Greek and Roman ideas, recognize individuality only for the upper class: the aristocracy of philosophers, tyrants, priests, etc. In this sense, individuality was a matter limited to privileged individuals. The rest of humanity had no rights and no individuality. Forti sees the emergence of the notion of individuality as coming at the end of the Middle Ages, but recognizes that it needed a long incubation to become more universalized. Forti notes that changing forms of economic and craft activity generated experimental activity and experimental research and stresses the implications of this perspective, which drove curiosity and the emergence of science. He notes that this period coincided with the idea that commoners enjoy status as individuals. This may be analogous to the shift from feudalism to mercantilism (from status to contract). Forti notes that we do not have an adequate explanation for the appearance of the machine, but that the machine and the human commune generated a concentration of labour and eventually associations and guilds of free

individuals emerged. He draws attention to the idea of ownership, of the enterprise, and the bourgeois as a new social actor, the capitalist and the entrepreneur. Forti also notes the role of law in the enhancement of individuality, reflected in the English experience of the Magna Carta. Notwithstanding, Forti's conclusion is that in the West the individual is the progeny of the Renaissance.

Winston P. Nagan and Aitza Haddad in their paper bring in the dimension of human rights activism to the discourse on individuality. Their paper commences with a reference to a 26-year-old vegetable vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, who took a stand against the Tunisian dictator and whose example spread throughout the Middle East, in what is known as the Arab Spring. Their paper draws attention to the importance of the individual as a stakeholder and activist in the promotion and defence of human rights. Their paper reminds us that the modern culture of human rights emerges as a consequence of conflict and struggle. Their paper then examines the role of individual agency in deepening and broadening the idea of justice, drawing on references to the most modern philosophical and economic theories of justice and dignity. The paper then identifies the foundational values reflected in the culture of human rights and explores the advocacy aspects of the processes of decision making that are meant to defend and promote individual activism for the realization of the goal of human dignity.

Orio Giarini has provided an original and unsettling insight into individuality choosing for his title the notion of a secretariat of the soul and its assumed place in a domain of certitude. What he is in effect getting at, is that the way we perceive and understand phenomena has been seduced by a version of science that no longer is defensible. To a large extent scientific truth from a Newtonian perspective represents stability, stasis, and equilibrium. Giarini is struck by the implications of the insights of quantum physics in which instability appears to be the rule and stability, the exception. A powerful concept, which has emerged from this field, is the uncertainty principle. The idea here is that if you observe the mass of a particle, you cannot know its motion. If you can measure its motion, you cannot know its mass. Orio Giarini is interested in the broader implications of uncertainty in human relations and individuality, which he has applied in his other writings to an analysis of economic and social theory. Some of his views were anticipated in the US in an intellectual movement known as the "Revolt against Formalism." It was also reflected in an approach to law known as "Legal Realism." At the back of this movement was the idea that law, like life, mirrors its element of stability and instability. Indeed, Harold D. Lasswell, a former President of WAAS, once suggested in the context of the social sciences that instability is the rule and stability, the exception. These are the challenges that touch on society and individuality which Giarini's piece explores.

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Study of Individuality & Social Evolution in Literature

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Abstract:

Science unravels the universe and empowers man. Technology has made life easier and is continuing to make the inconceivable possible. Social studies chart the evolution of society along various lines, and steer it towards greater progress. Apart from development and enjoyment of the aesthetic sensibilities, can the arts directly contribute to our understanding of life and our capacity to promote the progress of society?

Literature is a creative art, but it doesn't merely entertain. It reflects life. It portrays the values and aspirations of people and society, even the political atmosphere, economic situation, and social attitudes of the times. One good idea from a book can inspire individuals to acts of greatness. Powerful words can and do spark off revolutions. Inspiring stories can initiate progressive social movements or spur worldwide debate and reform. Fiction is often the forerunner of technological innovation, challenging man to actualize what he dreams of. Literature reflects history, elevates the present, and creates the future.Great literature is true to life. Great writers are seers of life who reveal through words subtle truths regarding human character and the character of life.

Literature provides unique insight into the process of evolution that governs the advance of society, civilization and culture. It offers greater depth of penetration than either historical narrative or biography because it can portray the subjective psychological and social consciousness of the characters and the times with far greater depth and realism. Therefore it can be a powerful complement to objective analysis of external institutions and events.

This paper analyzes Jane Austen's famous novel Pride & Prejudice to derive insights into the relationship between the development of society, the development of human personality, and the role of the evolved individual in process of social advancement. Although often regarded as a comic romance, on examination we discover that it offers profound insights into the process of social development at the time of the French Revolution when dramatic changes in social values, attitudes and behaviors in England made possible peaceful evolutionary change through intermarriage between the classes in place of the violent revolutionby mass exterminations that took place on the other side of the English Channel.

Ever since man began drawing on the walls of caves, he has been expressing himself in a myriad ways. His canvas has changed beyond recognition, from stone toparchment to today's liquid crystal display. The medium has evolved and diversified, from primitive line art to exquisite paintings, from crude hieroglyphs to flowing poetry and prose. Regardless of the form or the medium, man's need to express himself has produced treasures of great value, of which the world's literature is a precious part.

The aesthetic value of literature is long established and appreciated. This paper is an attempt to focus on another of its values – the profound and subtle knowledge of life, society and human nature which is embedded in great fiction. That knowledge is of immense relevance to humanity today as it gropes to consciously shape its own future. And most valuable of all is the insight literature offers into the most remarkable and powerful of all human creations, the individual, and the role of the individual in the evolution of society.

Literature is not just a reflection of an author's fertile imagination. It reflects life. It portrays the values and aspirations of people and society, even the political atmosphere, economic situation, and social attitudes of the times. It provides unique insight into the process of evolution that governs the advance of society, civilization and culture. It offers greater depth of penetration because it can portray the subjective psychological and social consciousness of the characters and the times with far greater depth and realism than history or biography. Therefore it can be a powerful complement to objective analysis of external institutions and events.

Victor Hugo's portrayal of the spirit of revolution among the common people in France during the 1830s in *Les Misérables* and Anthony Trollope's portrayal of 19th century English elections, corruption and parliamentary politics in his *Palliser Series* can be a powerful complement to objective analysis of external social institutions and historical events of the time. There are ideas we understand about slavery from Harriet Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and its abolition from Margaret Mitchell's *Gone With the Wind* that are difficult for a research report to depict or explain. Anna Sewell's *Black Beauty*, called the Uncle Tom's Cabin of the Horse, that describes the travails of work horses, resulted in legislation protecting the animals and changed the mindset of people regarding traditional and fashionable practices that caused much suffering to animals. The lives of the factory workers at the time of the industrial revolution that changed the face of England and the world have been well researched and documented. But Charles Dickens' portrayal of *David Copperfield* adds realism, a personal perspective of the situation, insights which a mere historical or statistical description cannot provide. Apart from being a story of adventure and romance, Alexander Dumas' *The Three Musketeers* is a meticulous historical and social record that paints a vivid picture of the close ties between religion and politics in France, the concentration of political power accompanying the rise of absolute monarchy, the extreme detachment between the extravagance of the wealthy and the poverty of the common people that later turned to revolution, and the machinations in military governance and international relations in the 17th century. Dumas' description of the precarious war-like situation between countries precipitated simply by petty, personal reasons is a lesson for the 21st century as well. Coming to a book of recent times, American intellectual Gene Sharp's writings on democracy and nonviolent action have beenthe inspiration and guiding force for revolutions that have ushered in change in many countries, most recently in Tunisia and Egypt. If a man writing in Boston can influence people and initiate progressive changes in the far corners of Burma, Bosnia and Zimbabwe, the role of literature does deserve serious attention.

One good idea from a book can inspire individuals to acts of greatness. Powerful words can and do spark off revolutions. Inspiring stories can initiate progressive social movements or spur worldwide debate and reform. Fiction is often the forerunner of technological innovation. Literature reflects history, elevates the present, and creates the future.

This paper analyzes the famous novel *Pride & Prejudice* to derive insights into the relationship between the development of society, the development of human personality, and the role of the evolved individual in the process of social advancement. *Pride and Prejudice*, written by the eighteenth century English novelist Jane Austen, is a comic romance set in rural England at the time of the French Revolution. It is the story of the Bennet couple and their five young daughters, and their quest for love, marriage and fulfillment in life. As the story traces the falling and rising fortunes of the Bennet girls, we discern the emergence of individuality in society, and its impact on the larger movements in the land.

The Industrial revolution had begun at that time. Across the Channel, the French revolution was raging. America had recently won her independence. But in stark contrast to such epochal eventstaking place all around, Austen's novel is a meticulous description of the pleasant and fairly uneventful country life, with its balls, dinners, proposals and weddings, marriage being the undercurrent of the entire story.

Not just the story, the entire lives of women at that time revolved around marriage. It was every girl's aim. It was her family's wish. It was society's expectation of her. She was supposed to find fulfillment only through marriage.The 19th century British philosopher John Stuart Milldescribed the situation succinctly: "Women are so brought up, as not to be able to subsist in the mere physical sense, without a man to keep them… as not to be able to protect themselves… without some man… to protect them… as to have no vocation or useful office to fulfill in the world, remaining single; and what little they are taught deserving the name useful, is chiefly what… will not come into actual use, unless nor until they are married. A single woman therefore is felt both by herself and others as a kind of excrescence on the surface of society, having no use or function or office there... a married woman is presumed to be a useful member of society unless there is evidence to the contrary; a single woman must establish… an individual claim." So, no woman was single by choice.

The eldest of the Bennet girls is twenty three and feels all the pressure to find a husband. Her mother Mrs. Bennet is more anxious. An unmarried girl was left with little choice. She could take up employment as a governess, and resign herself to a life of hard work and relative deprivation. Or she could stay dependent on the charity of her wealthier relatives. In either case, she became an old maid, an object of pity and derision.So Mrs. Bennet spends her every waking moment planning, dreaming or talking about her daughters' marriages.

Into such a society and family comes Elizabeth, the second Bennet daughter. Elizabeth is anintelligent and strong twenty one year old girl. She ispleasant, good natured and naturally cheerful. Nothing worries her much, not even the thought of marriage. In fact, she is not thinking about it at all.Her elder sister has been waiting patiently for years for a marriage proposal. Her friend, not willing to wait, takes things into her hands and elicits an offer. Her younger sister turns her back on decorum and elopes with her lover. Elizabeth differs from everyone else. To her, marriage is an ideal union of two individuals who love and respect each other. It is not a ritual to be gone through to secure one's place in society.She will not marry because her sisters and friends do, everyone around expects her to, or because it is considered to be the woman's destiny. If she finds a man of strength and values, one she can love, and who reciprocates her feelings, she will marry him. If she does not meet such a man, she will cheerfully remain single, undeterred by any associated physical hardship or society's

unflattering comments. At a time when a woman derived her sense of self worth solely from being the wife of a man, Elizabeth does not need the prefix of Mrs. to her name for her psychological survival.

Her quiet village is stirred to life by the arrival of two wealthy young gentlemen. These gentlemen arouse interest among the villagers, their bachelor status combined with their substantial incomeslargely contributing to the general interest. One of the young men, Fitzwilliam Darcy belongs to an old, wealthy family of considerable standing. He has had a privileged upbringing, and moves in the highest social circles in the land. In the midst of the villagers notches below him in the social scale, he looks upon them as savages. He is many times wealthier than they are; he owns an estate the likes of which they might never have set their eyes on. So he believes he is their superior. He is affronted when they talk to him. He vehemently rebuffs every attempt they make to socialize with him. When his friend Bingley falls in love with the eldest Bennet girl, he dissuades Bingley from the pursuit, finds fault with the girland dismisses her younger sister, Elizabeth, as being just tolerable.

Almost all the neighborhood is in awe of Darcy's rank and wealth, even if his pride is repelling. The villagers are flattered by his presence. Elizabeth's friend justifies the pride, a young man with family and fortune has the right to think highly of himself, she argues. At a ball, Darcy makes disparaging comments about country balls to his host, who is pleased to be simply spoken to by Darcy. Darcy insults Elizabeth's cousin, who is gratified to be addressed by the gentleman. Ladies with titles and inheritances angle for him, swallowing their pride and often, even self respect. They anticipate his every move, flatter him, compete for his attention, and go to ridiculous lengths to secure him. But Elizabeth, the village girl with no elegance or sophistication, little dowry, inferior connections, and hence less than promising prospects in the marriage market is neither impressed by Darcy's position nor intimidated by his demeanor. When the most distinguished man in the assembly calls her tolerable to look at and refuses to dance with her, Elizabeth laughs. She is not crushed at being rejected by a man of such consequence. She is not disappointed to lose the opportunity. She is not offended by the insult, she is not angry. She just laughs. Great strength is required to simply hold an opinion opposed to all society's. But greater still is the strength that can laugh at an insult, especially one coming from a man everyone around worships. In neighboring France, proclamations were passed, prisons stormed, church abolished and a gruesome weapon made part of the popular culture by decimating the monarchy and aristocracy – all to question the superiority of the higher classes and to demand equality. Here, Elizabeth accomplishes the same by laughing. What an impassioned and determined populace struggles to accomplish seems to be possible even for a single clear, strongindividual.Darcy, who is accustomed to being revered, desiredand fawned on, suddenly finds himself shorn of that aura of superiority he had been swathed in.

Earlier, Darcy had summarily rejected the villagers, looked down on their manners and taste, and felt time spent in such society a punishment. But sometime during those weary balls and tedious dinners, Darcy notices a pair of fine eyes in the face of a pretty girl. Her manners lack sophistication, her spontaneity is disconcerting, her family is vulgar. She has relatives in trade, residing in localities Darcy will not set foot in, and she has no wealth or status. But Darcy is unable to take his eyes off the girl he recently wrote off as barely tolerable, Elizabeth Bennet. The thought of his own feelings is unpalatable to him, and he tries

to tear himself away from her. He argues with himself that he belongs to higher society, and cannot, should not stoop to Elizabeth's level. Her family connections will sully his name and pollute his hallowed estate. Deeply in conflict with himself, Darcy leaves Elizabeth and her village. But the spark of a feeling for a girl from a lower class is born in the heart of an aristocrat. This spark grows into a flame, now flickering, now steady, in the haughty landowner, and then in the lively village girl, and after many a confrontation and flare up, leaps outside and blazes all around, bringing down artificial social edifices without physical destruction and ushering in a new social order.

However, at present, alarmed at being drawn to a girl in an inferior situation, Darcy is in conflict with himself. He thinks he has subdued his shameful feelings by going away from her village, but the winds of change blowing in the land carry him to his aunt's estate, when Elizabeth is visiting her cousin in the same neighborhood.

Over tea and dinner, during walks in the park and at church, Darcy gets to admire those fine eyes again and again. She is no longer just tolerable. He sees there is more to her than just the fineness of her eyes. She may lack the elegance that often accompanies the high born, but her good nature more than makes up for her demeanor. Her values raise her higher than ladies of rank. Their fine silk and lace hardly embellish them like Elizabeth's cheerfulness does her. The strength of her character is more valuable to Darcy than wealth or property. The suavity of the city-bred, the sophistication of the wealthy, their knowledge of French and Latin and social etiquette pale in comparison with her keen intelligence and ready wit. Darcy makes up his mind. Her family is still odious to him, his friends will be shocked by the match, his family will disapprove. His fine name and estate are at risk of being sullied by contact with the lower ranks. But Darcy knows he wants to marry Elizabeth Bennet. Ladies whom he considered worthy of his attention, those of rank and wealth, now seem like empty shells or depthless shadows next to the girl he has chosen.

The French aristocrats swore by their superiority. They took their high birth as a license to assert themselves. They jealously guarded their rank, and prevented any contamination from the lower levels. Oblivious of the simmering discontent and resentment around, they maintained their haughty ways till everything was forcibly snatched from them. Lost in their self glory, they lost all their power, riches, chateaux and lives. Darcy, by choosing to recognize value in one socially below him, in learning to love a girl outside his rank, gives up his ego, and saves his head. Figuratively, this individual act saves the collective head of the aristocracy from the guillotine.

Darcy changes his mind and proposes to Elizabeth. Elizabeth's response makes him change his mind some more. Elizabeth has seen ladies indefatigably trying to secure Darcy. She has heard about the splendor of his estate. She sees the esteem in which he is held by friends and family, simply by virtue of his position. But she does not go, lemming-like, after Darcy. She sets her standards by a different scale. She is not a fortune hunter. Her ideas of fortune and misfortune differ. No sum of money can induce her to overlook his pride and rudeness. She cannot marry the man who, she incorrectly believes, has separated his friend from her sister, thus causing much grief to both sides. His detestable nature far outweighs the grandeur of his family and estate, in Elizabeth's eyes. Without pondering over his proposal for second, she turns him down, and never once looks back wistfully at the material and social advantages she has thrown away.

It was a time when a respectable lady could not make money. In some cases, she could not even inherit it from her father. With the notable exception of the queen of England, an English woman's property was turned over to her husband after marriage. She was not allowed to live alone, or be the head of a household. She could not have a career. "Single women have a dreadful propensity for being poor", Jane Austen said. She would know, being unmarried and dependent on her brothers herself. Therefore marriage was very often the ambition of women, and the objective for their education and training. Girls were taught to sing, dance and play musical instruments, to catch the eye of eligible bachelors. Painting and sewing could embellish their accomplishments and improve their chances in the marriage market. "Work" for a woman today may mean a variety of tasks, but in Austen's time, it was short for 'needlework'. Academic knowledge in girls was frowned on. John Gregory, an eighteenth century Scottish moralist, in his famous publication, "Father's Legacy to his Daughters" in 1761 asks ladies to refrain from exposing any learning they might have, this would hurt their chances of attracting a husband. Lord Byron himself once said that women should read "nothing but books of piety and cookery". Some knowledge of language and arithmetic that would enable them to be efficient housekeepers was all the academic knowledge that was deemed necessary for the girl, since it was the future of every fortunate girl to marry and keep house. Elizabeth does sing, dance and play the piano very well, but not to snare a husband. Nor does she employ any artifice or ruse for the purpose. Not all her work involves needle and thread, she spends considerable time reading and improving her mind. Far from hiding her knowledge, she enjoys an intelligent conversation, seeks opportunities to practice her keen wit and loves challenges. She does not worry about putting off a man with her sense or lively impertinence. Not that she is irreverent or rebellious for the sake of being so, but she will not follow the herd instinct and conform to mindless conventions. Marriage, unlike for most other girls, is not the all in all for her. And if it requires any compromise of her values, is not worth bothering with. And hence her prompt rejection of the proposal from the man she believes to be arrogant and unethical.

Half a century later, when Charlotte Bronte wrote Jane Eyre, many considered it shocking that a woman, a governess, who is the protagonist in the book, should narrate the story in first person, in such a strong voice. The Quarterly Review wrote that Jane Eyre exemplified the „tone of mind and thought which has overthrown authority and violated every code human and divine." The divine code, man said, was that a woman, even a fictitious one, should be mild and meek. Seen alongside this, Elizabeth's tone of voice, and of thought was without doubt a very strong one. In a society that encourages young women to exercise gamesmanship instead of honesty, and trade off value against land and fortune to secure a marriage, Elizabeth valuing character higher than all social and material wealth is a statement of her individuality. This at a time when, according to Mary Poovey, an American cultural historian and literary critic, women were encouraged "to practice propriety instead of displaying their intelligence, to practice self-denial instead of cultivating self-assertion, and to think of themselves collectively, in terms of universals of the sex, instead of contemplating individual autonomy, talents, and capacities or rights".

Darcy who had been under the impression that Elizabeth, like all other girls, was waiting to receive attention from him, is more than stunned. He did not know a girl would have any grounds for rejecting a man of rank and fortune. Hearing her charges about his pride, which

he feels is natural, and behavior that seems only befitting, he learns for the first time that a man is more than his high birth, there are values higher than income, rank that he takes for a resplendent armor is turning out to be an illusion. For a man who from childhood had been encouraged to be proud and selfish, to be abused and rejected is a hard blow. But Darcy does not react summarily in anger. He does not give vent to his shock, humiliation and disappointment through bitter words or thoughts. Out of sheer sincerity and psychological strength, he gives his feelings a proper direction, using them to transform himself into a good human being valued for what he is independent of his family name.

Instead of reiterating his stance, surrounding himself with those who bow to him and fortifying his ego, Darcy sheds his negative traits. As his pride, arrogance and resentment leave him, better things occupy the space, he becomes humble, courteous, a real gentleman. He and Elizabeth part after the unsuccessful proposal, but providence brings them together again. Elizabeth is on a holiday with her aunt and uncle when they unexpectedly run into Darcy.

Darcy is now all that Elizabeth could ask for. Elizabeth has long since been Darcy's ideal wife. But unexpected news reaches them, Elizabeth's youngest sister has eloped with George Wickham,the son of Darcy's former employee, a thorough rogue who has tried more than once to betray his patron.

Darcy is at a crossroads now. He has declared his love for a girl from a social stratum much below his, and let go all his class consciousness and the pride stemming from it. He looks beyond the superficial and discerns higher values such as goodness and strength, both in himself and Elizabeth. But now her family has stooped to new depths, its name has been dragged through the mud. By any standards, the family has fallen, and related itself to his arch enemy. Should Darcy safeguard his family honor so carefully nurtured for years, maybe even for centuries by others before him, and disassociate himself with the Bennet family? Elizabeth can go nowhere, meet no one without her sister's infamy being whispered about behind her back. Did he not know that his aunt would disapprove in very strong language? Would not his friends snigger, and ladies stick up their noses at Elizabeth? Could he survive if that halo of propriety and superiority that had been hisis gone?

Darcy takes the way forward. He does not pause to worry about public opinion or conformity with societal norms. He loves Elizabeth, and sets off in search of her sister. He traces the runaway couple in an area in London he would not normally set foot in. Finding that Wickham does not intend to marry Elizabeth's sister, Darcy coaxes him to change his mind, offering to settle his debts, get him a job, and set up his house for him. Wickham is in dire straits, and decides to accept the lucrative bargain. Darcy arranges the wedding and personally takes care of every detail. He attends the wedding and makes sure that Wickham keeps his commitments. He saves Elizabeth's sister, and consequently, her family from ruin.

That Darcy saves the sister and the Bennets is plain enough. But in fact, in saving them and assisting his employee's son, Darcy has also saved himself. Anobility that is rigid and conceited, that refuses to budge an inch is eventually brought down from its pedestal rudely. The French nobleman who looked disdainfully at his tenant farmer eventually had to make way for the peasant, and pay for his disdain with his head. The English historian G M Trevelyan said that if the French nobility had been capable of playing cricket with their peasants, their chateaux would never have been burnt. It is on the record that on that July day in 1789

when the Bastille was stormed, some 300 miles away in Hampshire, the Earl of Winchelsea was playing cricket, and bowled out before he could score a single run, by an untitled man, William Bullen. Whether it was playing cricket with a commoner that saved the Earl's chateaux or not, it was definitely embracing his employee at some level that saved Darcy's future. Wickham had been trying to get at Darcy, but Darcy instead stoops to Wickham's level for a while. He sets Wickham free of his debts, takes care of his basic needs, and lends him some respectability. He takes on the task he is not obliged to do, and ensures that Wickham is permanently indebted to him. By assisting Wickham along his career and providing occasional monetary support, Darcy obliges Wickham to not burn bridges behind him. A potential threat has been blunted, and a foe converted into a harmless, though perhaps unwilling ally.

Some nobleman might have been willing to overlook difference in statusearlier. An aristocrat had probably liked a commoner before. An earl might have wanted to marry a girl without title. A lord might have wished to be friendly with his dependents. But the unwritten rules of society forbade them. But when one strong, bold individual dares to break those invisible bonds and takes a step, others naturally follow. This movement, this inter class marriage, this mingling of the ranks, initiated by Darcy, and emulated by others, homogenized the highly stratified and class-conscious society. And that eventually saved the whole country the bloodbath that neighboring France experienced. One individual, acting out of his highest values, can and does play a pivotal role in making history. In England, a peaceful social evolutionreplaced violent revolution.

Unconscious of these undercurrents, Darcy comes back to Elizabeth's village. Elizabeth feels gratitude, respect and love for him now. Jealous ladies who would like to marry Darcy try to turn him against Elizabeth, but heremains strong in his resolve. Darcy's noble aunt, alarmed at the threat from the lower ranks, attempts to bully Elizabeth into submission. She asks Elizabeth to stay within her sphere. But Elizabeth does not give in, she is strong in her conviction that one's sphere is not defined by the land one owns. She has seen proof of Darcy's love for her, she has come to love him deeply, and no one else's sense of right and wrong can influence her thought. And so when Darcy renews his suit, she accepts him readily, bringing to a happy, harmonious conclusion the tale of *Pride and Prejudice*.

Darcy, the heir of a distinguished family in England marries Elizabeth, the girl from the lower gentry. In the process, he accepts links with the trading class in Elizabeth's aunt and uncle. He mollifies the conservative aristocracy that can still not come to terms with the changing scenario, by healing the breach with his aunt later. He accommodates the needs of the lower ranks that are aspiring to rise, by making Wickham his brother in law, and replacing the simmering hostility with a truce. By looking beyond class, title, wealth and rank, and truly loving Elizabeth, Darcy starts off a trend that is mirrored in numerous incidents throughout the country, and eventually ushers in a peaceful social evolution in England.

This cheerful love story depicts England's subtle response to the French Revolution, and the peaceful progressive evolution that was effectuated in England. More specifically, it depicts the role of formed individuals in bringing about radical social change. For the one thing Darcy and Elizabeth share is a willingness to transcend the prevailing values and behaviors of their time, to act out of deeper personal convictions which place them in conflict with the societies in which they live. Like her creator Jane Austen, Elizabeth Bennet is the

prototype of the modern woman, who has the courage, strength and individuality to reject the material and social security of a respectable marriage. Fitzwilliam Darcy is the pioneering aristocrat who breaks every established centuries old norm, voluntarily gives up his privileges even when it disturbs his sensitivities. Both are in search for something higher and truer, even at the risk of failure or ostracism. Elizabeth achieved that higher goal by social elevation through marriage. Darcy's psychological fulfillment matches Elizabeth's material rise. Their creator, Jane Austen accomplished two hundred years later, by gaining literary immortality.

To make a fire, all it takes is a spark. Not a steady flame, not even a shower of sparks, but just one single spark. Its size is of no consequence. The size of that which is to be lit is beside the point. One lone spark can grow to immense proportions and encompass all that it encounters. Similarly, one inspired individual, inspired by the right ideas and values, can set in motion and generate consequences that change a nation or reach around the world.Such an individual is a living center of the illimitable.

A History of the Individual in European Culture

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Abstract:

We are the children of our land and the concept of individuality is shaped by the history of our culture. In this exercise there are two preliminary remarks I would like to make: First, despite the geographical distance, sometimes, there are great similarities in the definition of "individuality" among cultures, for example, between the Indian and the European ones. Second, in our globalized world, we have to look for those elements, in the puzzle that compose "the concept of individuality" which are common. In my paper I'll try to sketch the history of "individuality" in Europe. In the ancient Greek and Roman worlds as well as in the rest of Europe, which were dominated by the ideal of "aristocracy" till the middle-ages, the status of recognized individuality applied only to very few. At the end of the middle-ages, the concept of the "individual" started to emerge. But it took a long time to become a formalized universal and accepted concept. We can say that this took origin at a time that goes back to a period between the late 1200s and 1400. Transition from the civilization of the middle ages to the civilization of the Renaissance played a main role in creating individuality. The actors were science, technology, the bourgeoisie and mainly, the "individual".

We are children of our land and the concept of individuality is shaped by the history of our culture.

There are two preliminary remarks I would like to make regarding the subject of Individuality: First, despite the geographical distance, there are great similarities in the definition of "individuality" among cultures, for example, between India and Europe.

Second, in our globalized society we have to look for those common elements in the puzzle that constitute "the concept of individuality".

If we try to provide a reasonably shared definition of an "individual" as we conceive it today, we could say that:

The individual is a free human being with his own values and is "protected" by the "universal declaration of human rights" as adopted by the United Nations, applied by many but not all the U.N. member states.

Authoritarian regimes do not recognize the rights of the individual, particularly if the individual brings with him his or her values which are different from those imposed by the authoritarian power.

I will not make a list of these countries "pro bono pacis"; but, as you know, it would be a long list.

I'll now try to sketch the history of individuality in Europe.

Not so long ago, the church was imposing the dogma of the "holy writings" and was ready to condemn or simply burn those men and women who had different ideas. There was no space for the recognition of individuality as in the case of Giordano Bruno and many others who were burned alive. It was the same story at that time, for the protestant world.

In the ancient Greek and Roman world, dominated by the ideal of "aristocracy", the status of a recognized individual applied only to a few: philosophers, tyrants, priests, emperors, augurs and a few others. It was a society of privileged individuals, where few had all the rights and many had none at all. This type of society dominated Europe at least 'till the transition from the Middle-Ages to the Renaissance'.

At the end of the Middle-Ages, the concept of the 'individual' began to emerge. But it took a long time to become a formalized universal concept. We can say that it had its origin during the period between 1200 and 1400.

This was a time of transition between the end of the middle-ages and the onset of the Renaissance. An old equilibrium was breaking up.

This type of status, in thermodynamics as well as in society, tends to create turmoil and novelties with the tendency towards a new status, as Prigogine showed.[1]

The concept of the individual could not but appear in a period of dramatic transition.

It was the end of a phase that lasted nearly 2 millennia, if we consider the fundamental contribution of the Greeks to culture.

The European of the XV century found himself surrounded by the ruins of his/her old certitudes.

The earth was no longer the center of the universe. Where was God? Christopher Columbus discovered another world with strange animals and human beings, so different from those described in the holy Bible and those we had known for centuries. All this took place around the time that the Black Death occurred between 1300 and 1400 AD, which drastically reduced the entire European population.

The Europeans, to escape country brigands and harassment by landlords, assembled in towns protected by walls: the "communes".

The "individual", the concept of "individuality", emerged in fact during these troubled times, with the rise of the "commune", a revolutionary new social aggregation, and with the birth of a new social class: the bourgeoisie.

There are many reasons to support this idea.

The disregard for practical and manual activities and the aristocratic attitude that went back to the mental habit of the Greek and Roman society (where, for example, Euclid refused to consider any practical application for his mathematical theories) were coming to an end.

At the end of the XIII century, many philosophers and thinkers began to recognize the importance of the "artes mechanicae", craft activities, and manual labour. Roger Bacon (1214-1292), a Franciscan, supported in his writings the "artes mechanicae", experimental

activities and experimental research, was critical about the traditional attitude of the church, and was particularly against the Aristotelian Thomas Aquinas. Bacon said about Acquinas: "How can this person without knowing optics, mathematics and alchemy, without knowing "le arti minori", how can he know "le arti maggiori" (philosophy, theology etc.)?"

Now in a transition period so important for our history, focus was on human beings, the world around us, the earth, and on a series of activities that in previous times were disregarded.

Even the church, with thinkers like Bacon or the school of Chartres, shifted their attention from the sky, to see the life on earth around with its simple manual activities in a new light.

In the past, nobody would have dared to praise the technical progress and instruments, like Bacon and Petrus Peregrinus of Maricourt did.

Bacon says of Peregrinus: "He is shameful to ignore what is known to the ignorant, he is an expert in the arts of those that are working metals and minerals of any type, and he always gave attention to the enchantments of the old ladies and those of the witches".

Bacon was an alchemist and an outstanding mathematician, and represents an important turning point in the attitude of the Church. Bacon, the technician and inventor of all sorts of ideal machines, was the one who was able to predict with intuition the technological destiny of men.

So now, the idea that a large part of the population, and those we would describe today as commoners, had their activities recognized as well as their status as individuals accepted.

It was a great cultural change: also time was secularized, with the bell of the church replaced by the clockwork of enterprise that marked the working hours during the day.

And the "machine" suddenly appeared, which was another crucial actor and a further step, as we will see, towards the recognition of the individual.

Many hypotheses have been put forth regarding the appearance of the "machine", a phenomenon which is called mechanization.

For nearly half a millennium, from the end of the Roman Empire, there had been no significant technical innovation and now suddenly "impromptu" all sort of technical instruments, tools, mechanisms and machines were popping up. Why such a change?

Was it due to the lack of manpower? In Europe, at the end of the Middle-Ages, there were practically no slaves left and the Black Death had wiped out a large portion of the European population. This may have resulted in the need and interest to mechanize work.

Simple tools like the gear and others needed to apply the energy of watermills to various productions were now in use. The building and diffusion of new machines might have been facilitated also by the progress in metallurgy, which made iron cheap and readily available.

Typical is also the fact that only now appeared the invention and use of the helm, steering mechanism that would allow, with the new building techniques and with the help of compass and astrolabe, the oceanic crossing.

There is no satisfactory explanation for the appearance of the machine.

As we all know, the history of science and technology as well as that of our society is not linear but is made by sudden, unforeseen and unpredictable changes. And as Popper says, any historical or deterministic explications will be wrong. And the great historian of science, Alexandre Koyre, reminds us that Pisa does not explain Galilei or Archimedes of Syracuse. Nor Woolsthorpe, I would add, Newton.

Inside the commune, the diffusion of the machine with the establishment of small laboratories and workshops was creating a concentration of workers. They associated in corporations and "guilds": associations of free "individuals" with the same interests and profession.

The corporations had democratic statutes in order to protect the "identity" of the work and the activities of their members.

Also the commune was governed with democratic rules with the participation of citizens represented through the corporations and other associations. A large part of the inhabitants of the "commune" began to be recognized as a socially and politically active part of the community: as "individuals" with their rights and duties. Typical, in this respect is the constitutional text of the municipality of Todi in which is stated that the municipality will be run by common people and craftsmen with popular laws.

This is why we consider the "commune" as a democratic experiment typical of the European society, the culture medium of the "individual".

In Muslim society, the commune disappeared in the "mare magnum" of the Umma, the universal community of the Muslim world. And in China the commune had mainly a rural character.

During the XIV and XV centuries, laboratories began to associate themselves leading to the creation of small enterprises concentrating on the entire production cycle: raw material, industrial treatment and commercial distribution of the production.

The owner of this first enterprise was the "bourgeois" a new social actor, an "individual ante litteram" in the European panorama as we know him: capitalist and entrepreneur, far from the Byzantine and European merchant of Braudel and well described by Werner Sombart. The bourgeois was fundamentally individualistic and promoted the protection of their private and intellectual property. Thanks to the development of the press, the first patents emerged in Florence in 1421 and in Venice in 1474 and would rapidly spread to other countries.

Sombart in his book *The Bourgeois* gives us a vivid picture of the bourgeois through the character of Leon Battista Alberti.

Industrial activities were expanding all over Europe in a sort of pre-industrial revolution and the bourgeoisie confirmed itself as an increasingly economically powerful social class, the engine of the industrial and social development in Europe. From "Homo sapiens to Homo faber". Large masses of peoples who once did not have a specific identity marginalized by the feudal system were now assuming their own identity in the new historical context.

The beginning of individuality was physically protected in England, by Habeas Corpus (in the Magna Charta signed by King John Without Land in 1215, who had guardianship over not only private property but also over the physical integrity of its citizens).

European society was now rapidly evolving with the rise of the bourgeoisie and tended to become largely composed of recognized "individuals". Hence the ignition of the great individualistic bourgeois engine from Renaissance times, which thereafter would propel Europe towards the industrial revolution and the well-known series of scientific, technological, economical and social successes, (not to forget "les droits de l'homme" after the French Revolution).

Jacob Burckhardt, the great historian of the Renaissance, in his book *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* provides us with a first modern definition of the would-be "individual".

"During the Middle-Ages the veil covering human souls was a cloth of faith, biases, ignorance and illusions…in so far as the human being was considered only as belonging to a race, a population, a party, a corporation, a family or any other forms of "community". For the first time, it is Italy that has broken this veil and dictated the "objective" study of the State and other worldly things. Close to this new way of considering reality, it further develops the "subjective" aspect, and man becomes "individual", spiritual, assuming consciousness of his new status."

And I would agree with Burckhardt that, in the Western society, the "individual" is the Renaissance's child.

It has not been an easy path as we said; we took almost 500 years, with great pain if we remember Giordano Bruno and the many others. Today in Europe, the human being is finally not a number, but an individual.

The Monster ready to cancel again the free identity of the individual is still here and his name can be Big Brother or the various racist and extremist groups active in our democratic society. The monster is also still there inside the theocratic regimes or inside those regimes inspired by black, red or green fascism.

Primo Levi reminds us in his book *If this is a man* the humiliation of no longer being considered an individual, but relegated as a mere number in the Nazi concentration camps.

It is up to us, free men and women, to chase back this monster to an irreversible past.

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Individuality, Humanism, & Human Rights

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Abstract:

Our article emphasizes the essential role of the individual as a transformative agent in society and the demand by individuals as essential to the development of human rights. The article contends that human rights emerge out of struggle in social process at all levels. That struggle is the struggle for the recognition of basic rights and essential dignity. In this regard, the paper also provides an insight into the foundation of values behind the idea of rights in human rights. In this regard, it also explores the importance of aesthetics as a human rights value. Additionally, the paper makes the essential linkage between rights and opportunities, and insists that values require processes to secure the satisfaction of human wants and needs. Reference is made to Dworkin's emphasis on the right of every individual to make his life a successful experience rather than a wasted opportunity (ethical principle) and conceding the same right to others (moral principle) provides a powerful and compelling rationale for enhancing human rights value demands universally.

1. Introduction

We want to introduce this theme with reference to the events of global salience that have come to be referred to as the Arab Spring. These events are a good starting point to underline one of the most central values implicated in the culture of human rights, namely, that the individual is a subject of human rights policy and practice. Additionally, some may see human rights as only words on paper which implicate symbols. There is a deeper meaning. The real meaning of human rights ultimately comes from the stakeholders, those who stand to benefit from human rights in practice and theory. And those stakeholders are the individual human beings of the planet. We would suggest that human rights would not have the dynamism that it has had, as a radically infectious global scheme of fundamental expectation, without the individual human rights agents generating human rights activism from theories generated by human rights scholars and professionals and implemented by ordinary person individuals. It would be appropriate for us to understand what it is that generates the activism from the individual human beings and how that activism may creatively appropriate symbols of communication to generate a sustained activist presence demanding that states and pressure groups conform their behaviors to human rights expectations.

One of the global events we experienced in the aftermath of the Second World War was a rising tide of elevated expectations about the fundamental values behind the idea of universal human dignity. The modern crisis that this rising level of expectation generated was

an increased level of resistance to these expectations, generating what might be called 'the global crisis of human rights'. We suspect that the founders of the World Academy had an institutive sense of this problem and considered the matter to be of global salience which required, in part, the commitment of scholars unconstrained by parochial and chauvinistic practices of identity.

On December 17th 2010, a vegetable vendor from the village of Sidi Bouzid was confronted by a police official who confiscated his cart and his produce. Mohamed Bouazizi was the vegetable vendor. He was 26 years old. Bouazizi was the sole income provider for a family of 8. Bouazizi tried to retrieve his cart and his vegetables by willing to pay a small fine to the police officer. The response was official arrogance with insults directed at his deceased father. When Bouazizi went to the municipal office to complain and to retrieve his goods they refused to see him. Bouazizi was so angered by injustice, governmental repression and complete indifference that he returned to the governmental headquarters, doused himself with inflammable fluid and ignited himself.[1] Bouazizi's action had struck a nerve. It highlighted the abuses of a political dictatorship and its denial of individual self-respect and integrity. Bouazizi's action in destroying himself symbolized the frustration of a whole nation with its loss of dignity and self-respect and the regime's complete indifference to human rights. Bouazizi's act triggered widespread protests against the Tunisian dictatorship and the intensification of popular protests finally resulted in the fall of the dictatorship. Bouazizi, the individual, acting as an activist, generated a mass mobilization of ordinary people to demand the exit of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The President ruled Tunisia with a ruthless iron fist since 1987. Although he was a dictator from the point of view of important Western powers, he was their dictator.

The success of the popular uprising against the Tunisian dictator had radiating effects on its immediate neighbor to the East. Egypt had been run by the dictator Hosni Mubarak for over 30 years. He too ruled with an iron fist and with a dislike for rule of law, democratic values. The Egyptian people were in a position roughly comparable to the repressed Tunisians. The Tunisian example inspired individual protesters to begin protesting the dictatorship of Mubarak. In the face of severe reaction and elements of state violence, the demonstrations grew in size and sustainability. Eventually, Mubarak was forced to leave by the activism of the Egyptian people.[2] The Arab Spring then began to develop traction in the gulf states of Arabia, including Yemen and Bahrain.[3] The influence began to be felt in Libya. The Libyans were concerned about Gaddafi's dictatorship and wanted it to go.[4] Elements of the Arab Spring also figured in renewed Palestinian demands for an end to the Israeli occupation.[5] Most importantly, the Baathist dictatorship in Syria found itself under a major popular national insurrection demanding that the current dictator of that country leave.[6]

These acts of individual activism, inspiring the mobilization of ordinary people, began to have effects in states far removed from the Middle East. For example, Israel experienced a significant level of activism in which "occupiers" protested the social injustices that appeared to characterize the policies of the state.[7] In the United States the economic crisis generated a concern for the deeper questions of political economy, fairness and social justice. The activists that gave these issues important political traction targeted Wall Street for sustained occupation demonstrations.[8] That example spread throughout major cities of the U.S. and its immediate impact has been to radically shift the terms of political debate with a focus and

insistence on fairness and greater equality. European cities had also been inspired by occupied activism.

We suggest that at the back of the Arab Spring and the occupier activism is a deeper and more important element that is reflected in the role of the individual as a stakeholder in the important issues of our time. Indeed, at the back of the Arab Spring and the demands for social justice are the foundational questions behind the human rights values of the global community which add up to a demand for the universal recognition of equal respect and human dignity. Human rights represent the most agreed upon and defensible value system of the political and legal culture of the entire world community.[9] Human rights are mentioned in several provisions of the United Nations Charter of 1945,[10] and received fuller development in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948.[11] These two instruments represent the most carefully crafted framework for establishing, in political and juridical terms, the idea of human dignity founded on explicitly articulated human rights. What is crucial is that these instruments emerged and probably could *only emerge as a function of conflict and struggle*.

Human rights, as the struggle for dignity, did not begin or indeed end with the tragic events of World War II. The struggle for human rights historically has been about the struggle for essential dignity, decency, and justice.[12] In this context, struggle means a willingness to advocate, defend, promote, and, if necessary, die for these values. In his closing statement to the Supreme Court of South Africa, in the *Rivonia* Trial in 1964, Nelson Mandela explained to the Court and to the world, that he had struggled for the values of freedom and dignity and that if necessary, he was willing to die for those values.[13] Mandela symbolizes every human rights activist regardless of time, culture, economic, social, national, or ethnic background. Cecil Day Lewis, in his famous poem, the "*Nebara*," expresses a similar theme poetically;

> *"Freedom is more than a word, more than the base coinage of statesmen, the tyrant's dishonored check or the dreamer's mad inflated currency. She is mortal we know, and made in the image of simple men who have no taste for carnage, but sooner kill and be killed than have that image betrayed. Mortal she is, yet she rises always refreshed from her ashes to home, where man's heart with seasonal warmth is stirred. Freedom is more than a word."*[14]

Without human agency demanding justice, liberty, freedom, self-determination, and essential human dignity, it is difficult to imagine that humanity would have *any* rights, let alone human rights. The emphasis on demand is, in contemporary terms, the identification of the capacity for individuals and groups of individuals, however associated, to engage in the clarification and articulation of their fundamental interests. Without this clarification, activism itself is blind and unguided. The clarification, recognition, and expression of demands and claims are therefore crucial to any strategic and tactical deployment of human resources to secure the access and benefits of those demands and claims. Interest articulation, therefore, is a critical aspect of humanistic dynamism and a critical foundation for the development of the most comprehensive culture of human rights on a global basis. Modern theories of justice are inspired by the humanistic dynamism of the struggle for human rights values. For example, Professor Sen has an approach which focuses on values in terms of needs, freedoms and capabilities.[15] From this he distills an approach to justice in which there is an essen-

tial dynamism between human preferences, human capabilities and process freedoms. The expression of human capabilities requires the opportunity to acquire capability freedoms. However, the dynamism required to acquire the opportunity of capability freedoms is intricately related to the process aspect of freedom. In short, values require processes to secure the satisfaction of human wants and needs. Thus, process feeds opportunity and capability guides process. Moreover, these processes are rooted in human rights, advocacy and decision.

The further clarification, which targets the role of the individual in the theory of human rights and justice, is reflected in the recent work of Ronald Dworkin.[16] Dworkin starts with the relationship of ethics and morality to individual action and responsibility. The ethical question for the individual is "what does it take for a life to go well?" This ethical principle is a focus on the nature of self-respect. Self-respect requires that the individual takes his own life seriously and appreciates that it is ethically important to make one's life a successful experience rather than a wasted opportunity. This principle therefore reinforces the individual responsibility for self-respect and authenticity. The individual must be self-aware of the ethical responsibility to identify what counts in life as a success. The moral principle, which is derived from this, and which has global implications, is, if my ethical principle of self-respect is important to a life that it is not a wasted opportunity, then that is a principle that I can support with regard to all non-self others on the planet; in short, a principle of morality and justice for all of humanity. Both of these theories of justice root the essential dynamism of it in the individual as a starting point. There is a recognition, therefore, that the individual, in taking responsibility for a successful life, is essentially a transformative agent in the social process. For Sen, individuals have capabilities which they should recognize and the need for the demand for opportunity to fulfill those capabilities.[17] Dworkin frames the issue slightly differently but in a way that is not incompatible with Sen.[18] According to Dworkin,

> *"we need a statement of what we should take our personal goals to be that fits with and justifies our sense of what obligations and duties and responsibilities we have to others… Dworkin also requires capability and process freedoms, if life is not to be a 'wasted opportunity.' There is a genius in joining opportunity and capability with a responsibility to take one's life seriously as an aspect of both personal and community morality. The idea that each individual has a right to a life of self-respect and authenticity – which must be given operational effect by capability and opportunity freedoms – moves from that of an ethical commitment to that of a moral principle, in the sense that self-respect, authenticity, capability and opportunity freedoms are encapsulated in the universal principle of human dignity. Dynamism is rooted in the responsibility and obligation of the person to respect oneself. Such respect is sustained by the idea that the self is truthful to the self and, therefore, expresses to the self its self-validating authenticity. This means that the subjects of the idea of justice are meant to be active participants in the shaping and sharing of justice, and, moreover, to be active participants in the transformational dynamics of the principle of justice."[19]*

These views about the essential relationship between human rights values and the idea of justice effectually require the individual human being to be a subject of justice and a stakeholder in the promotion of the idea of justice implied in the fundamental human rights values. We now consider more carefully the role of the individual as an asserter of demands in the

dynamism of human rights and justice. The critical discourse of human rights should now carefully consider the entire process of claim assertion, of *demand advocacy*, as crucial to the promise of human rights. To suppress the human capacity to identify and assert fundamental interests, to undermine the institutionalized expression of institutions' effective advocacy is effectually to suppress the possibility of developing human rights and making them real in a manner that promotes peace and defends the foundations of personhood. It is the melancholy history of human experience that the suppression of thought and communication makes human beings servile, unfulfilled, and without a capacity to realize fully their innate human capacity to experience dignity and human creativity in its most appropriate manner.[20] Ultimately, the suppression of the ability to express needs, claims and demands is thoroughly insidious in its depreciation of the human prospect. In short, such a process simply erodes the capacity for human genius to contribute creatively to the improvement of man and society.

If we read into terms such as *freedom, equality, justice* and *self-determination*, the principles of dignity and human rights, we capture the sense that these values can never be extinguished so long as man is willing to struggle for them. Whatever the difficulties and sufferings in the struggle for human rights and dignity, there is the idea of hope, resurrection, and a refreshed and progressive expectation in the commitment to the struggle. Thus, the focus of this contribution is on the idea of dynamic humanism as an indispensable and complementary component of the human rights process and the imperatives for realizing a global society committed to a global culture of universal respect and dignity. In the next section we clarify the basic values behind the formulation of contemporary human rights.

2. The Humanism of Basic Rights and Their Central Values

The UN Charter and the UDHR were the global community's response to the most-bitter war in human memory, distinguished as it was by the concept of total war, which characterized Hitler's Germany.[21] It was a war that targeted civilians as well as members of the armed forces and a war that made the extinction of certain civilian groups a major strategic and tactical objective.

The struggle for a global rule of law, which could make peace a major and critical expectation for all peoples of the world, had a founding moment with the adoption of the UN Charter and later the UDHR in 1948.[22] This immediate background to the current structure and process of human rights holds a powerful insight; human rights and peace are things for which ordinary decent people have had to struggle.

Struggle did not begin or end between 1939 and 1945. From time immemorial, human beings have been involved in struggle and conflict.[23] Invariably, struggle has pitted the powerful against the powerless, and the powerful against the powerful, with the powerless caught in the middle. Across time and culture, the powerless have never given up on the idea that there is some dignity and worth in their own self-consciousness of being. The poor and the weak, the colonized and the dominated, the slave and the serf, the Semite in racial terms, and the Harijan in caste terms, all have sought to challenge the powerful to expropriate their humanity and dignity.

Today, there is a widespread acceptance of the centrality of the human rights principle as an indispensable part of international law and morality, and that this principle is meant to

represent the appropriate basis of the organization of the global social and political process.[24] This does not mean that there is precise agreement about exactly what human rights are and what they mean, both substantively and procedurally.[25] The fact that there are as yet no conclusive answers to many questions about the nature of human rights does not mean that there is not a great deal that can be profitably learned from what is already known, both in terms of standard-setting and the processes of implementation.

In a cross-cultural, diverse world of interdependent states, groups, associations, and persons, there will be divergent views about the ultimate source and precise methods of justification of core, basic, or fundamental rights designated *human rights*. What is constant about the human rights expectation is that, in the focal lens of human rights, every human being is a stakeholder in its promise. If that promise is symbolized by the term *human dignity,* then all human beings must be stakeholders in demanding, defending, and promoting human rights to secure their essential dignity.

a. Functional or Working Values That Guide Humanistic Demands for Human Rights

There is considerable controversy concerning whether universal human rights are at all possible.[26] To the extent that such a controversy still influences important institutions of global power, it is also important to recognize that—prior to the assumption of the juridical and/or moral dimensions that justify any fundamental human right—it is critical that we are able to formulate normative claims and expectations that are clearly observable, and which may be functionally as well as analytically expressed by human agents of claim and demand. The practical reason behind this is that human beings generate problems in their relationships with other human beings. The problems invariably involve claims and the resistance to claims. The claims are about the values that human beings deem important and thus are desired. Those desires are invariably expressed as claims or demands involved in conflicting understandings and assertions of values and their importance.

However, whether human rights originate from *a priori* contemplations or bitter experience makes little practical difference if they secure empirically-based expectations that ground the principle of human dignity. Whatever the theoretical basis is for the UDHR, an observer's view of the claims may implicate the decision challenges they provoke; and the consequential promise they hold for human dignity is quite self-evident. The conceptual rights in the UDHR can be translated into functional value categories with the challenges they pose to global society and its constitutional scheme based on the UDHR. That is to say, there are a cluster of complex claims concerning the main values in the Declaration, and those values may be functionally identified and expressed.

1. **The value of life:** This is a centrally valued human subjectivity.[27] It is referred to not in the "pro-life" sense (that a pregnant woman must bear a child), but in the Bill of Rights sense (that a person has right to personhood and autonomy). The value of life, therefore, includes the respect and deference given to the individual in the global community.[28]

2. **The status of the value of power and security:** Should it be narrowly or widely shared? Is the common interest of all honored in a system that seeks to secure the widest possible participation in all key areas the power process? One of the central values identified in

the Atlantic Charter was the freedom from fear.[29] This concern for freedom has evolved so that today no one denies that there is a critical interdependence between the concept of peace as a human right and all the other values in the UDHR. Peace and security might well be included under the functional category of power.[30] However, peace is recognized as a complex peremptory component of the human rights value system.[31] It is of value to again recognize that there are complex ways in which all human rights values have an influence on peace and security, recognizing as well that peace and security at all levels are critical conditions for the effective mobilization of human rights values. A central aspect of the values of peace and security relates to the connection between the mobilizing force of strategy for the realization of human rights goals and the realization of these goals themselves.[32] For example, is it appropriate to deploy violent strategies of action to achieve human rights objectives? Is it appropriate to disengage the value discourse involving strategy and struggle on the one hand and idealistic value objectives on the other hand? Gandhi, for one, insisted that the morality of struggle was even more important than the morality of distant idealistic objectives.[33] Indeed, he also insisted that a disconnect between struggle, strategy, and goals was morally indefensible.[34]

3. **The status and value of economic and wealth processes:**[35] Is the common interest of all better secured by optimizing the capacity to produce and distribute wealth or the opposite?

4. **The status and value of respect and equalitarian values:**[36] Should invidious discrimination be fully prohibited (covering all areas of race, gender, alienage, etc.)? Can equality be meaningful if it is only a formal, juridical idea without regard to the legacy of exploitation, repression, and discrimination?

5. **The status and value of educational and enlightened values:**[37] Should these values be widely produced and distributed or narrowly experienced?

6. **The status and value of skill and labor values:** The centrality of labor and skills values to the human condition indicates that these are central and fundamental values implicated in the rights and expectations of those who seek to create and sustain these rights and labor values.[38] Should these rights and expectations be widely shaped or narrowly shared?

7. **The status and value of health and well-being values:** The delivery of reasonably formulated and accessible healthcare and social services to all is now widely regarded as crucial entitlements, if the most basic standards of decency in politics and society are valued.[39] Today, unemployment aid, social security, medicare, and other social services are considered crucial to a society that cares for its people.

8. **The status and value of the family and other affective values:** Because the family is the basis of collective existence and is central to the human rights of children, the public policies of a society that destroys family (and other affective ties) pose a problem for the wide generation of affective values including the loyalty values of patriotic deference.[40]

9. **The status and value of moral experience and rectitude:** A system that endorses the centrality of moral experience to the legal and political culture and seeks to maximize the spiritual freedom of all is yet another of the central themes of the human rights agenda.[41] How do we translate expectations of care or fundamental moral experience

into the practical prescription of law and policy?

10. **The status and value of cultural and aesthetic experience:** The term cultural includes the concept of the aesthetic.[42] In fact, the word "cultural" could encompass all the value preferences that we might extract from the UDHR. There is, however, a narrower meaning that the term culture might carry. That meaning ties in with the notion of human rights as also emblematic of the diversity of human experience, experience that reflects the cultural richness of humanity as a global community. There is great controversy about the issue of culture and tradition, culture and creativity of the present, culture and the elaboration of the aesthetic, which may capture and nurture the cultural narrative of creativity and beauty which may in fact be the critical psychological view of how the glue of social solidarity promotes creativity.[43] The boundaries of this discourse are controversial. Sensitive matters of sexual regulation which may differ widely may be justified by culture and yet here the culture of tradition may not be compatible with the culture and creativity of the present or the future in human rights terms. For example, female genital mutilation justified by cultural tradition is not justified by either religion or by the science of human sexuality.[44] Human rights thus provide a process by which these boundaries may be appropriately protected and appropriately expanded according to the normative challenges of human dignity. The current discourse often suggests that universality trumps cultural relativity or vice versa.[45]This is not necessarily helpful unless one sees these ideas as only the starting point for value clarification and application from a human rights perspective.

11. **The status and value of the eco-system:** Today, we recognize a complex right to a viable eco-system on what theorists have seen as Spaceship Earth.[46] The values embedded in the protection and promotion of a healthy eco-system, are, like many other values, issues of complex inter-dependence and inter-determination. However, implicit at least, in the concern for the integrity of the eco-system is clearly the notion that there are no human rights if there is no environment in which human beings can survive and possibly even improve the human prospect.[47] But this insight suggests an even higher level of moral consciousness in the sense that the eco-system (with its plant life and animals, wild and domesticated) is part of a complex cycle, in which human beings are both custodians and also utterly dependent as individuals and as society. This means that we now see in nature not something irresponsibly exploited and destroyed but central to our identity as a sentient species. To take a simple example, for all the vaunted technology of human progress and human egotism, no one has seen a dog or a cat or a rat or indeed the most elemental of recognizable life forms outside of this lonely and unremarkable planet called Earth. Thus, as humanity, we now look at life even in its most humble forms as not only indispensable to the interconnected chain of life on this planet but we see in it something new and utterly connected to the very consciousness of being human and being alive. In short, we know that our dogs identify with us. We may now know those ordinary pets in terms of how they and all other living forms have shaped our identity both psychologically and physiologically.

The values outlined above essentially are abstracted from the UDHR and, more generally, from the International Bill of Rights. To give it an activist emphasis, the values are identified as having great meaning from the point of view of the struggle to enhance, to define, and

clarify them and to recognize the currency of these values is not something apart from human responsibility. Obviously, the precise content of these generalized values are challenged and indeed are part of the prospect of social and political activism.[48] On the other hand, these tentative clarifications of the nature of the human rights values also have areas of broad agreement among 'we the people' of the global community. It is a tribute to the creation of the UN system that human rights are a central concern and problem for humanity. The UN Charter makes numerous references to human rights as statements of aspiration, of pre-existing achievement as well as juridical and political development for the future. There is little controversy about the further level of conceptualization that collectively, the International Bill of Rights and the values that sustain it mean the commitment to universal human dignity.

b. Clarifying the Core Values of Humanistic Human Rights

Many important questions still vex the international system. What is the precise content of the rights in the UDHR? What intellectual procedures are to be used to clarify the specific content of each goal value or generalized right contained in the UDHR? How are international human rights to be implemented? What intellectually sanctioned principles of procedure are important to set out the procedural aspect of human rights realization? What are the explicit principles of content and procedure that permit us to clarify the value judgments in the human rights precept and to implement rationally these values in instances of particular application? In other words, how do we ground, that is, how do we specifically *prescribe* and *apply*, the value judgments contained in the human dignity precept?

Although there are important areas of concern about the theory and justification of human rights values, there are areas of broad agreement at a more general level about the fundamental values that should condition the social, political, and legal processes of the larger international community.[49] These may be summarized as follows:

1. Broad agreement exists about production and distribution of the core values in the UDHR and these values implicate both individuals and aggregates.

2. The values in the human rights framework cover both the so-called "negative" rights that purport to limit the abuse of power and the "affirmative" rights that implicate more directly the guidelines of responsible social change. Expectations in this latter category are styled "aspirational" rights.

3. While the word "universal" in the UDHR cannot be taken too literally, the nature of the rights in the Declaration has a more generalized character, a kind of "practical" universality.

4. The operative sphere of human rights is the socio-political conditions of interdependence and inter-determination. This means that rights are frequently "absolute," when they are contextually prescribed and applied. A cruder version of this point is the simple dictum that A's right or entitlement ends where B's like right or entitlement begins.

5. Human rights frequently give empirical specification to basic or fundamental interests.[50]

The approach to value clarification that we have outlined above may be usefully compared to the UDHR. The UDHR has been said to encapsulate three distinct generations of human rights: "first generation" civil and political rights; "second generation" economic,

cultural, and social rights; and "third generation" solidarity rights.[51] This common approach is stated in general terms. Since the rights are interdependent, this is not an approach which we value; nevertheless, the approach is conventional wisdom. First generation rights are represented in Articles 2-21; second generation rights are represented in Articles 22-27; and the third generation of solidarity rights are said to be represented in Article 28.

The second generation rights are the ones most controversial to constitution-makers, and the solidarity rights, with their transnational internationalist implications, may also be seen as far afield from conventional frames of constitutional law discourse.[52] The rights expressed in Article 28, viz that "everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized"[53] has been developed in various international law influencing fora to refer to a more equitable distribution of global resources, the right of all nations to political, economic, social, and cultural self-determination, and "the right to economic and social development."[54] Additionally, the right to a viable eco-system, the right to peace, and the right to humanitarian aid during emergencies also are reflected in Article 28's mandate.

This bare outline of the fundamental values attending the contemporary conception of human rights obscures a great deal of complexity, historical understanding, the pervasive and critical importance of normative insight in human experience, as well as the impact of science and change upon the human prospect. In short, human rights may have been influenced by trans-empirical or spiritual values, but its modern genesis is rooted in human experience. The human rights codes are actually given life and dynamism by the human element. We may describe this element as the element of dynamic humanism. The human element in dynamic humanism is the element of individual and associational choice. In short, human rights, as an aspect of dynamic humanism, are given momentum and relevance by the processes of human decision making. To illustrate this point with a specific example we may refer to the Polish Lawyer, Rafael Lemkin. Lemkin had an intelligence predicate for the scope of the Nazi atrocities and proceeded to dedicate himself to the creation of a universal crime of genocide. The term genocide is a neologism which he coined. However, the process of getting an international agreement on the idea of a universal crime for a major human rights violation encountered considerable resistance. It is possible that the leaders of sovereign states understood that the defendants in such a situation would be the state decision makers themselves. In any event, Lemkin's tenacity in pursuing the creation of the international crime of genocide is an inspiring example of the success of individual activism in the success generated by the adoption of the Convention that outlaws genocide.[55] Indeed, I do not believe that we would have had the universal, international crime of genocide without the humanistic advocacy of Lemkin. Additionally, the seeds that would ultimately emerge from this initiative may well be the inspiration for the creation of the International Criminal Court.

Today, we have countless illustrations of organizations which mobilized ordinary citizens' concern, activism and the corresponding influences on decision making with regard to human rights issues in all parts of the planet. For example, recent studies have shown that the global anti-apartheid movement was largely inspired by ordinary people's activism which in turn forced their governments to take stronger action against the apartheid state and which was a significant factor in the transformation of that country into a new political order.[56] Similarly, tremendous indecision in the international community regarding the scale

of atrocities of the conflict in South East Europe also generated citizen advocacy to reshape the dynamics of international intervention in that region.[57] More than that, it was again citizen advocacy that led to the creation of the ad hoc tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.[58] Today, civil society, human rights organizations operate with global reach and are one of the most important sources of human rights intelligence. These organizations, directly or indirectly, train citizen investigators, citizen reporters, citizen advocates and citizens as human rights transformational agents. Moreover, such organizations have been skilled in utilizing modern technologies to strengthen global human rights mobilization. For example, Amnesty International has a sophisticated urgent action network, which permits it to have instant communication with thousands of members who focus on urgent human rights actions. This can be expeditiously done because of the speed with which a crisis can be communicated worldwide and generate an equally expeditious response.

3. Human Rights: A Functional Humanistic Approach to Activism and Decision

One of the great contributions to social and political theory made by a former President of the World Academy, Harold D. Lasswell, and his long-time associate and Fellow of the Academy, Myres S. McDougal, was to provide an insight into the architecture and related functions of the concept of decision making itself.[59] They contended that any decision would implicate an aspect of private or public policy.[60] Therefore, a generic sense of what decision making means must be rooted in the individual social participant, who frequently functions as both a claimant to shape decision making, as well as a decision maker per se. The functions of decision include the functions of (1) intelligence; (2) promotion; (3) prescription; (4) invocation; (5) application; (6) termination; (7) appraisal.[61] Any decision would implicate all of these functions, although these functions may be poorly appreciated by the decision maker. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that the creation of a legal and political culture of human rights, as a global mandate, requires a deeper appreciation of the human responsibility for choice and decision in which human rights perspectives are grounded in the global social reality. We should also keep in mind the influences that may be brought to the focus of human rights choice and decision. Among those influences is the activism of the ordinary social participant human rights stakeholder. The stakeholder is essentially an advocate and an articulator of human rights interests and values. However, it would be important that advocacy target and hopefully influence the specific, identifiable functions of decision making in the human rights global context.

The analytical markers identified as functions of decision-making are kept discrete for analytical and descriptive purposes. They are, however, inherent in the processes of decision-making and in practice, and influence one another in complex ways. The result of which is a decision or choice. For our purposes, the emphasis will be on the decision function of promotion or advocacy. This emphasis is meant to clarify the role of advocacy, or interest articulation, within the structure of decision in order to maximize and influence beneficial outcomes in choice and decision that sustain human rights expectations. Moreover, this emphasis gives us a clearer sense of the actual workings, prospects, and efficacy in the actual human rights decision process.

Advocacy depends on knowing the facts, identifying the players, and understanding the problems that require interest articulation. The relationship of advocacy or interest articulation to decision making is often under-appreciated in the sense that the focus of inquiry tends to be on the decision outcome, and not the forces that drove interest articulation in the first place. However, without interest articulation, without the express demand for the basic values that human beings feel that they have a right, decision-making would be a pale shadow of its appropriate social and political importance. This phenomenon is partly observed in societies involved in transition to democracy. When those freedoms are initially established, the culture of interest articulation and advocacy remains weak as a function of the pre-existing political order. Thus, there is often the outcome of democracy denuded of effective interest articulation and effective advocacy.

In our time, we have witnessed the growth and strengthening of civil society on a global basis.[62] This development is not simply random and inexplicable. Civil society is the outcome of the demand and the need for advocacy in the demand for good governance, the rule of law, and universal human rights.[63] Civil society, by definition, is not the state; it is part of the community comprising the state. That community insists that its voice be heard and that its advocates promote and defend the interests of ordinary people. Further, the growth of civil society is not confined to states. It is a global phenomenon.[64] Thus, the term global community refers to global civil society and even more to the processes that generate focused interest articulation and effective advocacy. One of the most important global outcomes inherent in the civil society process has been the development of civil society interest groups specialized on a global basis to the promotion and advocacy of human rights.[65]

A central problem that effective human rights advocacy encounters is the problem of obtaining the facts about human rights deprivations, and also predicting the prospect of human rights violations in the future.[66] Thus, the human rights problem for which advocacy and promotion are demanded will need an intelligence predicate to determine whether to proceed, and, if so, how to tactically and strategically present and prosecute such a claim or demand in a forum most effectively calculated to respond meaningfully to the problem.[67] Without reliable facts or intelligence, advocacy and promotion are weak; and intervention is correspondingly undermined. A weak intelligence predicate weakens the strategic and tactical options of the advocate as well as the ultimate decision-making forum.[68]

The approach to human rights that stresses problems and interventions, such as advocacy and decision making, must examine carefully what is implicit in such ideas as advocacy, representation, and decision making (such as adjudication). Functional theory has distilled seven decision functions that are expressed or implied in human rights inquiry.[69] These decision functions are triggered by the processes of interest articulation and advocacy.[70] To be effective as an advocate and to effectively influence decision making, advocacy must target its expression of interest articulation with a view to providing a credible foundation upon which the normal functions of decision making made be deployed, and hopefully in the service of enlightened and altruistic interest articulation.[71] It is therefore obvious that the functions of decision-making are matters that fall within the strategic and tactical vantage point of human rights advocacy. What follows is a summary of the central functions of decision-making but essayed through the lens of effective advocacy as a strategy of interest or value articulation.

a. The Advocacy Functions of Intelligence

Human rights advocacy whose facts or intelligence predicate are flawed may have disastrous consequences for the credibility of human rights advocacy as a whole. In cases of grave human rights deprivations, it is usually the state that is the responsible actor. However, the management of information concerning these deprivations is a matter of the state's claimed monopoly over classified information generated by its intelligence services. Thus, a significant element of human rights work pits the intelligence claims of the state against the intelligence claims of human rights advocates. This is a very sensitive matter, and is often at the heart of whether human rights work succeeds.

Human rights organizations claim access to information using their own methods and research.[72] Thus, they generate databases, case specific material, and a great deal more. Their work is sensitive and often cannot compete with the state's claim to secrecy over intelligence that may implicate the state in wrongdoing. It is through the intelligence network, especially of NGOs, that we understand the scope, relevance, and capacity for intervention and its limitations.[73] Facts are a critical basis for decision-making responses or interventions because it is from facts that we garner the scope of human rights deprivations.[74] Human rights groups, therefore, claim the right to gather, process, and distribute human rights intelligence.

It is also a critical intelligence demand, inherent in human rights advocacy, that advocacy be based on intelligence that meets the criteria of dependability, comprehensiveness (within which we include systematic contextuality), selectivity (relevance), creativity, openness, availability, and economy.[75] Without an effective process of intelligence development the deployment of critical human rights advocacy functions are weakened. To appreciate the centrality of human rights intelligence to human rights advocacy and decision making, it is important to appreciate how intelligence influences all the other functions of advocacy and decision making.

b. The Advocacy Functions of Promotion

To understand the human rights issue or problem is to begin the process of promoting a solution.[76] The problem of mass murder based on race in World War II generated the promotion/advocacy functions of seeking an international prescription criminalizing certain forms of mass murder or group extinction which ultimately produced the adoption of a general policy outlawing genocide, a convention proscribing and punishing the crime of genocide.[77] Advocacy may also take the form of involvement in specific cases or issues such as those associated with survival rights. Often particular cases lead to an awareness of a practice and to levels of advocacy that have enhanced the scope and specificity of the International Bill of Rights.[78] It is hard to imagine the extent to which a Bill of Rights for mankind could have developed as it has during the past fifty years without the elements of advocacy, promotion, and attendant activism. One of the great functions of promotion is that it accesses the modern means of communication as a mechanism for influencing world public opinion.[79]

c. The Advocacy Functions of Prescription

Prescription is largely a legislative undertaking.[80] Legislatures and sometimes executives "make" law or other effective prescriptions. What is noteworthy in the human rights context

is that there is no super-legislature or super-executive. Human rights activism often has been merged into human rights lawmaking involving state, non-state, as well as international or regional institutional action.[81] Human rights NGOs often have been the triggering mechanism through research, advocacy, and activism to create the momentum that states and institutional actors need to create international or regional human rights regimens.[82] The focus on courts, legislatures, and executives as lawmaking agents is important; but this focus may obscure the broader array of participants, who facilitate, or even make, human rights law.[83] The central truth about official lawmaking—be it legislative, executive, administrative, or juridical— is that, without some demand, without some counter-demand that generates a problem in which modern communication systems facilitate the processes of advocacy and claiming, the official prescriptive outcome of a state would indeed be very modest.[84]

The focus upon the role of lawyers must not, of course, blind us to other decision-making participants and institutions that have responsibility for participating in the prescription, application, and enforcement of human rights.[85] For example, a joint resolution of the US Congress requests the executive branch to be more active in action against torture.[86] The resolution requests that the chief of mission, usually the ambassador, actively investigate allegations of torture and make representations on behalf of the victim.[87] This would require the ambassador to use his diplomatic position to facilitate compliance with basic human rights. The US Foreign Assistance Act makes foreign aid contingent upon some measure of human rights performance.[88] This makes both the Congress and the executive branch of the US Government responsible for the employment of economic assistance as a vehicle to advance human rights and trends toward democratization.

At another level, there are many UN agencies whose work directly or indirectly impacts upon the delivery or non-delivery of human rights. The Committee Against Torture does not require that its "experts" be lawyers; The Committee on Civil and Political Rights similarly does not mandate a legal training for its members; The special rapporteur on torture may be a lawyer, but there is no explicit rule requiring this; The UN Human Rights High Commissioner in this situation was a distinguished politician.[89] This all suggests that the culture of human rights in a global context includes advocates, decision specialists, as well as scholars and scientists from very diverse backgrounds, cultures, and professions. What ties them to the culture of human rights is that they are directly or indirectly involved in aspects of decision making that have human rights consequences and impacts.

d. The Advocacy Functions of Invocation

Lawyers in both advocacy and adjudicatory roles are familiar with the processes of fact-problem-prescriptive characterization of issues for the purpose of the specific application of human rights norms. The case of *Filartiga v. Pena Irala* is a good illustration of the invoking function.[90] However, invoking is not confined to courts, be they national or international; any human rights institution of intervention can and often does perform this function.[91] Thus, when Amnesty International focuses on an urgent action death penalty, torture, or disappearance case, it is in fact performing this kind of provisional function often in contexts of extreme crisis.

e. The Advocacy Functions of Application

In an application situation, the advocate has a crucial role in specifying the nature and practical efficacy of the remedy. A central challenge for human rights is invariably the scope of the remedy. It is the advocate's job to define that scope for the authoritative decision-maker. Where the institutionalization of the decision-maker is at a higher level, such as at the European Court of Human Rights or at the US Supreme Court, the greater the ability of the advocate to predict an actual, effective, and final application and enforcement of human rights prescriptions in concrete situations is.[92]

Application is a significant problem for human rights in an era of globalization, during which there is still great dependence upon the decentralized application of human rights policies and prescriptions.[93] The international community has in fact created a significant consensus as to what human rights are and what general prescriptive force they must have.[94] On the one hand, the application of human rights norms through the United Nations represents institutional weaknesses as well as financial and logistical limitations, and on the other hand, provisions in key human rights covenants prescribe state obligations to prosecute or extradite offenders. These treaty-required obligations impose on states obligations that many tacitly believe to be their reserved domain of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction.[95] Decentralization comports with political and legal reality, but also generates an inconsistent, untidy political mosaic of practice and precedent. The growth of human rights institutions, such as regional commissions and courts, has added coherence to the application of human rights standards.[96] Moreover, constitution making in the post-cold war world has generated institutions of basic law in some states that are extraordinarily human rights sensitive. The application of human rights norms also requires skills in grounding human rights values in specific cases. These cases represent important political challenges for theory and practice; but central to the success of advocacy is the ability to craft a framework that persuades the authorized decision-makers that application is necessary and effective.

f. The Advocacy Functions of Termination

The termination of advocacy may mean that a favorable result has been achieved.[97] It also could mean the abandonment of advocacy that has the effect of terminating the possibility of decision-making responses.[98] All decision-making affirms and disaffirms certain preferences. The central challenge of the terminating function in human rights law is impressive. For example, human rights law in comprehensive perspective seeks to terminate all law and practice which is incompatible with the dignity of man. Termination thus is more than simply prescribing, promoting, and applying human rights law; it is terminating reactionary, retrogressive law of the old system.[99] The importance of termination is vividly illustrated in US death penalty litigation; the US Supreme Court cannot quite develop a consensus to outlaw capital punishment.[100] However, it has not terminated the practice, but instead, using loopholes and strained constructions, has in fact validated the execution of the mentally retarded, children, and upheld convictions where race is a factor. An important objective for the human rights advocate is to ensure that argument persuades the decision-maker that the decision will terminate the problem.

g. The Advocacy Functions of Appraisal

Human rights law, like natural law, provides a standard against which positive law can be rationally evaluated. It provides thus a critical component in addition to reason and rationality in the appraisal of the state of both domestic and international public order.

4. Human Rights as a Dynamic Humanistic Struggle for Dignity

In setting out the issues and problems that limit the scope of contributions that academics can make to the human rights agenda, the core ingredients of a solution to the dilemma can be identified. The solution requires a theory for inquiry about human rights.[101] The theory must have a decision-making focus to have practical relevance, since only effective decision making—formal or informal—will apply human rights perspectives and operations to particular situations and contribute to a human rights-conditioned future.

A theory about human rights, that is policy decision-focused, must self-consciously concern itself with the policy process itself by integrating actual human rights problems that require policy responses; both the problems and the decisional responses to them must occur in a disciplined contextual setting and the decisional responses must employ processes that meaningfully clarify the policy basis of human rights prescriptions.[102] Theoretical inquiry about this kind of emphasis must embrace cross-disciplinary tools of inquiry, or multiple methods, to give scientific credibility to the enterprise. This requires fidelity to at least four essential features of a theory about human rights inquiry from a humanistic policy perspective;[103]

1. **Comprehensive mapping:** Fundamental to an inquiry is the expression of a comprehensive map of human rights problems specified in terms of functional value categories and which permit continuing refinement and elaboration. A systematic expression of these problems will underline the difference between human rights deprivation and human rights realization. The lexical formulation of human rights as rights is frequently the tail end of a process that needs illumination.

2. **Relevance of context:** Factual, theoretical, historical, and political contextual relevance must drive the theory. All human rights, in the sense of process, must be seen in relation to every relevant community context, from local to global.

3. **Relevance of advocacy, policy and decision:** The focus on policy and decision requires the identification of past, present, and future decisional mechanisms at every level of community that may be relevant in clarifying, specifying, protecting, and enhancing human rights. We should of course keep in mind that policy and decision do not function in a vacuum. Frequently what triggers a policy response is a problem that emerges from the social process context. That problem will emerge in the form of a dynamic humanistic claim for a human rights value and an aspect of social process that will respond by resisting that claim. Therefore, the quality and sustainability of interest articulation and advocacy will be an important foundation for a response that is authoritative and controlling to the problem that is eventually presented for decision.

4. **Relevance of key intellectual tasks for inquiry:** The relevance of the identification and use of appropriate intellectual tools is necessary to clarify the rational, theoretical and

factual basis of the context of human rights, as well as the procedures for their realization in fact. The key discrete intellectual tasks are; goal and value clarification; the historic study of relevant trends; the scientific study of causes and consequences of human rights failures or successes; the concern for predicting possible future scenarios in terms of approximation to desired human rights goals; and the creation of alternatives to better approximate the desired human rights goals.[104]

5. Conclusion

The broad outlines of an approach to human rights that stress the dynamic humanism of the individual in the global environment and the importance of creative advocacy in search of solutions that from a policy point of view enhance and strengthen human rights globally remains a vital challenge. In particular, the emphasis on humanism is also a focus on the recognition of an enhanced responsibility in individuals and human institutions, in particular, institutions of science and enlightenment. These challenges are both theoretical and practical and require an enhanced sense of responsibility and an enlarged sense of empathetic identity with all of human kind. Obviously this challenge is one that requires us to struggle with a much broadened sense of who we are, and in particular, responsibility requires that the breadth of our identity be global and universal.

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Secretariat of the Soul and Certainty

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Editor's Note:

The quest of science over the past several centuries has been to replace the no longer sacred truths of religion with a new source of verifiable and authentic knowledge. During its nascent period, science chose carefully its subjects for investigation, confining itself to the most obvious clockwork cycles, repetitive patterns and apparent similarities in physical nature. Yet, its very success in charting the elements, classifying living species and deciphering the rhythm of the heavens led it to venture further into less certain realms until it happened upon the surprising discoveries of quantum physics. Thus, in place of the foundational faith in natural law, certainty and predictability, which characterized the scientific outlook of the 19th century, physical scientists in the 20th century ventured to explore the enigma of uncertainty, unpredictability, irregularity and complexity inside the atom, in shapes and forms, turbulent flows and other apparently chaotic phenomena. Even today the social sciences cling to shallow coastal regions where law, order and certainty appear to prevail in human affairs, avoiding to venture into the inexplicable realms of uncertainty. No subject is as far afield from the safe shallows of certainty than the remarkable phenomenon known as individuality. On the face of it, uniqueness and individuality appear to be the very antithesis of what science is qualified to examine, no less understand, yet in these distance seas so far from the safety of solid land lie greater truths and richer discoveries than any so far known. This brief essay and short dialogue, written with reference to the social sciences in general, have profound implications for revealing the laws and unraveling mystery of individuality.

Culture is the bedrock of social evolution. Strong signs of change in both society and culture are anticipated in literature. The profound shift in thought that took place during the last century regarding the infallibility of scientific certainty is an example of such a profound cultural and social change. One of the greatest innovations of the early 20th century was the overturning of deeply-seated beliefs in the natural sciences, particularly in physics. It all began when Einstein's discoveries challenged the Newtonian view of reality, though Einstein did so reluctantly and spent the last years of his life attempting to prove that physics could once again be built on some certainties fixed and definitive in space and time. "God doesn't play dice," he once remarked about quantum theory.

Since then, indeterminism and uncertainty have occupied an increasingly greater space in the fortress of the philosophy of science. We find them, for instance, permeating the thought of philosopher Karl Popper on empirical falsification and Nobel physicist Ilya Prigogine on complexity. Both strove in their own ways to reconcile the apparent contradiction between certainty and uncertainty, which constitute two halves of an elusive still greater truth.

Ironically, if we look instead at the human sciences, particularly economics, we do not get the impression that this profound development in thought and culture has yet been recog-

nized. Still today, my fellow economists aspire to be taken as seriously on the scientific plane as the physicist or biologist. They were almost convinced of that attainment several decades ago when a Nobel Prize was introduced for economics. The ambition of this discipline has been, until very recently, to seek to provide social economic analysis with a presentation as sure and accurate as the natural sciences were thought to be equipped with. Psychology too has fallen prey to the lure of scientific respectability, focusing largely on typal characteristic of human personality and repetitive patterns of behavior, leaving the distinctive and unique to artists and poets.

These developments in philosophy and science have had profound practical significance. The 20th century marked a struggle between two contradictory worldviews over which two world wars were fought – one founded on belief in the power of the collectivist State backed by modern science, industry and centralized power; the other founded on faith in the power of the free individual and free society, founded on human rights, aspirations, creativity, idealism and spirituality. An interminable battle was fought for greater freedom and awareness and responsibility in freedom. Today we find ourselves in a new world – culturally, socially and psychologically – capable of dealing with uncertainty, yet filled with the thirst for security which lures us into the arms of blind conformity and uniformity.

The notion of uncertainty has progressively replaced that of certainty. Modern science, for most scientists, is no longer conceived of as a structure where once and for all a certain definition of reality is established and remains valid forever in time and space. Science is no longer viewed as a permanent edifice to which additional bricks of knowledge are conti-nuously added and fixed forever. Every time science produces a new brick, a new building material, the whole structure of existing thought is subject to question and review. It is a dynamic vision that makes itself felt, no longer a vision in which truth is eternal, universal and immutable in time and space. 'Truth' is never found; only greater truth is. Every ancient truth is continuously redefined and modified into new 'truth'.

The very history of evolution seems ever less like a series of equilibrium situations, and increasingly like a system perpetually leaning toward non-equilibrium. The identification of an "imbalance" highlights the fact that numerous possibilities for development always exist. The definition of "balance" implies a purpose that can easily prove to be an "imbalance" if our observation and perception of circumstances change. Some modern mathematics books can be cited, such as Kline's for example, which highlight how for a given problem tenable logic and mathematics can be applied to arrive at multiple solutions, each equally valid. Thus, we learn that we cannot apply ideas about natural science from the determinist period of the last century to justify determinist views, or views in which every future can only consist of the inevitable development of an evolution with only one way out, to which we apply the term "scientific". Evolution can take several directions: they appear determined only *a posteriori*, while everything that will happen in the future is uncertain – fortunately!

Paradoxically, it is by accepting the notion of uncertainty in the natural sciences that a link is generated for forging a union, a new alliance, between the "humanities" and the so called natural sciences. The natural sciences, which are only exact for a limited period in time and space, differ from the human disciplines or humanities only in the degree of uncertainty.

It will take a little time for culture to acquire the courage and maturity to fully welcome these ideas: to accept uncertainties without turning to drugs − physical, intellectual or ideological – and lead the way in eliminating life's challenges and pluralism, both in day-to-day living and in the historical dimension.

Let us, therefore, avoid building new medieval castles with the false hope that by hiding behind these ramparts we can enjoy greater security. Uncertainty forms part of the order of things. It is through uncertainty that a real possibility for progress exists. Fully conscious of the risks, overcoming every kind of frontier, our best survival and development are made possible. It is on this uncertainty that the future of Europe and the World hinges.

It is for this reason, that two decades following the Club of Rome's report on *The Limits to Growth*, I submitted to the Club my report on *The Limits to Certainty*, an economic analysis closely linked to some cultural fundamentals.

Balance Sheet for a Secretariat of the Soul and of Certainty

The tension between the two world views and the process of reconciling them is reflected in the literature and art of the past century. The writings of Robert Musil, an early 20th century Austrian, have been a cultural reference point for me regarding this quest for reconciliation between certainty and uncertainty. He represents the culture of "Mitteleurope", of central Europe, to which Trieste Italians like me are particularly sensitive. He is best known for having written a book entitled *The Man Without Qualities*. This translation of the title constitutes a betrayal. The German term is "Eigenschaften", for which the term "qualities" is an incongruence. It would be better to use the word "properties" in the chemical meaning of the term. The book describes the state of a man who, in a world dominated by science and the determinist view of things, refuses as a person to be limited to one specialty, to be tied exclusively to one label. The drama is even more powerful when one knows that Musil had a scientific education and that in his time education in the humanities and in the sciences were completely separate. This inner conflict between scientific determinism and the individual's freedom of choice gave rise to his conception of the man without qualities, who feels far from the world that arose immediately after the First World War, – when even political theories tried to become "scientific" – which was on its way towards one of the greatest disasters in history.

The book begins in a paradoxical manner: Ulrich, the protagonist of the long novel, is tasked with setting up a "Secretariat of the soul and of certainty". The date is August 1913. Some German patriots decided it was important to celebrate the anniversary of William II. Austria had not succumbed to the charm of Prussia and Germany, and wished to prepare great celebrations for Franz Josef who, in 1918 would celebrate 70 years of his reign, an impossible event given that when Musil wrote his book it was already known that the emperor and his empire no longer existed. The 70th anniversary of the reign of Franz Josef was meant to have taken place on the basis of the idea that it was possible to overcome the cultural barriers which at the time (and in part still today) divided what Musil called the two half-truths. On the one side is a world founded on the scientific ambition to arrive at some certainties through physics and mathematics; it is the world of science, understood as the realisation of the 19th century utopia that aimed at assuring society of a future made up of certain, definitive and

absolute knowledge. On the other side, Ulrich is condemned to impotence because human reality and the species' becoming are made up of more or less irrational deductions and intuitions that are not ascribable to Cartesian type definitive certainties, and which challenge the mechanistic and deterministic forecast towards the inevitable.

Two "*half-truths*"

Musil opens up the path to a new culture where science is no longer only deterministic, but presupposes a dialogue with indeterminism rooted in the soul, in the uniqueness of the individual. And on this path he represents the beginning of the possibility of rebirth. Musil alludes to "two half-truths" because he knew them both very well. He had written a thesis on Mach, was an engineer and had a mathematician's ambitions. At the same time Ulrich himself, in the novel, remembers ever so often that mathematics is the field in which he tries to make concrete his aspirations towards precision. From his previous book *Young Torless,* it can already be seen that Musil is very attracted to the intuitive and impulsive aspects of human existence. Nevertheless, he does not allow himself to be taken in by stereotypes or by the Viennese atmosphere of that age, of which he is often harsh in his criticism. The judgment expressed by Musil about Vienna derives from the idea that it was a decadent provincial world, incapable of planning its own survival in contemporary reality. The place where a more solid European culture was to be found at the beginning of the century was Berlin.

The Man without Qualities begins with an account of what was strange in the kingdom of "KAKANIA" (Kakanie = Kaiser und Konig, Emperor and King), a world which no longer believed enough in itself to fight and to propose a synthesis "of the soul and precision". Ulrich feels alone and abandoned in such a world. The whole of Europe seems to be falling into ruin in its wild attempt to transform a half-truth of mechanistic certainty into a total and all-absorbing truth.

As the novel progresses, one realises that what Musil is trying to free is the New Man, the emerging individual who will arise amidst the crisis in Europe - Europe as an extrapolation of the Viennese world of the Austro-Hungarian empire of 1913, on which few hopes could any longer rest. There was not enough breath yet to give rise to a new culture, a new model capable of dealing with uncertainty rather than being subjugated by it.

Another proof of Musil's positive and optimistic will comes from a fierce criticism of Oswald Spengler and his thesis on the decline of Western Civilization. For Musil, this crisis was not inevitable; it was not registered among the inescapable "scientific" facts. We must learn that we are not an absolute truth, that man is not complete, that man is a project in search of himself, and that a civilization cannot give itself or create for itself a future if it separates, in a schizophrenic way, the aspiration for precision of the scientific type from the idealistic cultural aspiration in the broad sense. A surrender of our individuality would create an irreparable split and civilizational collapse.

Why evoke today the balance sheets of a secretariat and its activities which, as Musil's novel takes shape, end up disappearing in the reader's hands like sand that runs through the fingers and is scattered? There is an underlying cultural wave that can be found in hundreds of publications, which justifies the conclusion that the secretariat of precision and of the soul created by Musil in this novel has effectively accomplished its task a century later. Despite

having begun with an idea that has never been made concrete organisationally, one can now speak of a positive balance sheet. The two half-truths are no longer schizophrenically separate. We now live in a post-Cartesian reality in which ideas are no longer distinct. If they remain so, they often become irreconcilable and unproductive. There is an ever growing consensus on the fact that between one field of human knowledge and another there are grey areas, overlapping areas. Between poetry and literature, economics, political sciences, chemistry and physics, there are no longer any definitive irreconcilable divisions. The poet's inspiration is close to the physicist's intuition. The custom of cutting reality into slices was, after all, simply a tool of convenience to help promote research in a certain number of sectors, until the details could be integrated into the whole. This old method of thought is what caused the European disasters of the last century. It was the exclusive State-Nation and the lack of understanding of political federalism, condemned because "confused", that admitted and even stimulated a division of sovereignty.

Paradoxically, this secretariat that in the end was no more than a plan, today, almost one hundred years later can discover signs of its realization. We now have the potential to discover the means of reconciling these contradictory half-truths – that which conforms to universal law and that which is unique, that which binds us together as members of a single species and that which distinguishes the individuality of each. In that reconciliation lies an immense power for the advancement of civilization, science and culture and for the promotion of human welfare and well-being.

I pictured the following dialogue as an "Intermezzo".

Intermezzo: Dialogue on the Foundation of a Secretariat of Certainty[1]

"Did you say Ulrich, Ulrich Tuzzi?"

Having left the office I took about a quarter of an hour to get to the Grangettes clinic at Chêne-Bougeries, a district of Geneva. Near the car parking area, to the west of the building, I found an old two-storey house, surrounded by trees among which perhaps had survived four pines, already old at the time, and two birches described by Robert Musil in notes recounting the last years of his life. Unless, of course, those had been sacrificed to make way for the car parking area. I was just about to check whether the half-moon shaped pool was still there, when I became aware of the presence of a friend, a research Fellow from CERN (European Centre for Nuclear Research). He was a physicist and was accompanied by a person of about forty, a man with a decisive air, a high forehead and black hair brushed straight back. Both of them seemed to be looking for something in the area around the old house.

A handshake and my friend performed the introductions: "One of my colleagues from CERN, Ulrich Tuzzi".

He then explained that they had come to see if it would be possible to rent the ground floor of the house with the veranda so as to set up a general secretariat of certainty there.

"You see," Ulrich Tuzzi explained to me, "a few years before the outbreak of the First World War which was to put an end to the Austro-Hungarian Empire (I'm of Austrian origin),

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[1] This dialogue was originally published in French in Orio Giarini's *Itinéraire vers la retraite à 80 ans,* Economica , Paris, 2002.

my grandfather dreamed of creating a General Secretariat of certainty and the soul."

"I seem to remember reading somewhere…"

"---but he didn't succeed. He wanted to reconcile culture and the European scientific tradition, which from Descartes through Newton to our time has never ceased widening the gap between the soul and the body, between knowledge resulting from the natural sciences, and – something more difficult to define – that engendered by artistic perception, between certainty and uncertainty. He often used to say that in his universe, until then, every truth appeared to be divided into two half-truths."

"No! You who work in a highly prestigious centre of fundamental research are not going to tell me that the discoveries are only half-truths!"

"In a certain sense, yes. Some things were not so clear in my grandfather's time – a time dominated by positivism and by a great number of absolute and universal cognitive elements. As Popper said, Science progresses thanks to a process of falsification. It studies Newton's laws until it realizes that under certain conditions these laws are partially false. Up until the time when Einstein arrived on the scene and revealed that they were not completely relevant. After Einstein came Heisenberg and then Prigogine. Research is a dynamic process and does not stop with the acquisition of eternally valid details. With every new synthesis, every new detail, the meaning of the component parts and the theory of reference changes."

"But a chair will always be a chair, a tree a tree, an atom an atom."

"In a certain sense, and under certain conditions, yes. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle makes us recognize that at the level of the infinitely small, the equivalent of a chair can, at a determined point in time, appear as something absolutely different."

"Yet, it is true that technology becomes increasingly more efficacious and that I'm able to distinguish − in a manner of speaking – ever more clearly the infinitely small."

"There comes a time when the simple act of observing the infinitely small changes it because the energy released by the observation interacts with the object observed. A little more progress is made thanks to some mathematical models and formulae, but for the moment the situation is increasingly complex and the numerous hypotheses are often contradictory."

"My dear Mr. Tuzzi, if that is the case are you perhaps telling me there is no longer any difference between human and social sciences (in which we ourselves are immersed) and natural sciences, subject as they are by definition to clear and objective observation?"

"This designation has its limits. The exact sciences and social sciences are ever more frequently found in the same situation: they both deal with different degrees of uncertainty. But thanks to this we have a possibility of filling the hole that obfuscated my grandfather's view. From this it is clear that it is now possible that the creation of a centre for reflection on uncertainty would lead to something of which the general secretariat of certainty and the soul would have been incapable at a time when it was thought that these two poles were always separate. This is the reason the secretariat never came about and my grandfather lived this infinite romance, split by the contradictions between the nature of man and that of a certain positivistic science, in pursuit of a synthesis that seemed impossible. Today, however, the

word "End" can be placed on the word impossibility, thanks to a new age that is opening on research and knowledge."

"What you are telling me now is that your grandfather's life, or rather his romance, comes to an end precisely because it can continue…"

"There isn't a paradox. Concerning this, Musil wrote that 'men of this type certainly exist today, but there are not many of them, and for this reason it is difficult to assemble what is dispersed'. Currently a new culture is developing and spreading around the world, a culture in which it becomes increasingly less common to find isolated elements. A culture in which a New Alliance is forming, and as the Nobel recipient Prigogine states, it is a culture of a process of integration and construction."

"As a matter of fact it seems rather problematical to me that all this springs from uncertainty, and makes me wonder if the little certainty that remains in the world – some scientific certainties – is hidden beneath our feet."

"On the contrary, all the dogmas and pseudo-religions that are often transformed into political ideologies have totally exploited the concept of an exact, certain and inevitable science. From it they have deduced a great many legitimisations with no foundation. In the Middle Ages wars and massacres were justified in the name of God. Still more horrible, particularly barbarous massacres were perpetrated last century in the name of society's scientific laws. Never before had chaos been so efficiently orchestrated."

"But how is it possible to live and give life while proclaiming that uncertainty has a positive value?"

"It's not a matter of spreading uncertainty. The problem is recognizing that life is uncertain. Sooner or later humanity must decide to create a truly civilised world, built by people of proven maturity. This means recognising reality. It is an act of deep cultural awareness, essential if we want to avoid the manipulations of those who offer us definitive certainties. It is a matter of learning to live better, of accepting one's own responsibility, of facing uncertainty and accepting it. It will be the best of psychotherapies…"

"I see…It's not for nothing that you're Viennese…"

"Yes, but a Viennese who accepts reality, and who demands that there should be a speedy investigation into what in Freud is false."

"I must admit, my dear Mr. Tuzzi, that I'm a little, well actually, very puzzled. I understand that you feel great affection for your grandfather. But couldn't you perhaps say that your attitude is due, in large part, to a world in crisis, to a world in a state of decomposition? If I remember correctly, your grandfather lived in Vienna mostly during the years immediately before the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Could not his desire to found the general secretariat of certainty and the soul - I hope you will not hold it against me if I speak frankly – have perhaps come from a desire to flee reality, of taking part in the political breakup of his country and also, perhaps, of being to some extent responsible for it?"

"Clearly the Austro-Hungarian Empire had fallen into a serious crisis and was incapable of facing the historical developments of the time, and particularly the rise of nationalisms."

"A period that lasted several decades which appears to have coincided with the great development of the Industrial Revolution."

"Exactly, Cartesian and Newtonian logic corresponded to that of industrial specialisation, of material manufacturing productivity, of people specialisation and consequently that of nationalism and of the classes. The drama occurred when the line of demarcation between dialectic and conflict was broken and the breach became beyond repair. The incompatibility between these two poles is once again one that exists between certainty and the soul. The Cartesian method of subdividing the world and life reveals an approach that is intrinsically incapable of stimulating the differences in a positive way. Here in Switzerland it is accepted that the State guarantees and protects the individuality and sovereignty of the Cantons. This federalist system combines autonomy and supra-nationality, and reinforces them. It is the path, perhaps, that Europe is taking, in order to fully make the most of its peoples and their diversity."

"But an independent State can at least defend its freedom."

"It depends on its strength. Independence of unequal countries puts the weak at the mercy of the stronger. Only the strongest State can consider itself truly independent. Currently there are more than 150 'independent' States in the world. They all represent only half truths while international imbalances represent the other half."

"So, for you the fall of the Hapsburg Empire was a historic disaster. Don't you think this shows a little nostalgia on your part? You aren't by any chance creating your Centre to commemorate the anniversary of Franz Josef's birth?"

"I have to admit you are right on one point. On the one hand the many reasons for which the old Empire of the Hapsburgs had to disappear are soon told: its inability to present a valid plan for modern federalism, its indecisive management of the destructive effects of the Industrial Revolution, the clumsy renewal of the social structures… However, on the other hand it is necessary to underline the positive aspects of the co-existence of different peoples, not forgetting that the disintegration of the empire also opened the way to Nazi-ism. The essential point consists in finding in this new culture that is spreading throughout the world, a new possibility of overcoming the current situation, of progressing, of recreating an image of the future and of opportunities that the old cultures and ideologies (which are no longer those of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but rather those that destroyed the Empire) have increasingly greater difficulty in promoting."

"Your Centre of certainty certainly isn't lacking global ambitions. I'm afraid however that you're looking for a humanity that simply doesn't exist."

"Of course, in all of this there is a great challenge to be met. If no one takes it on it will be difficult for our planet to survive adequately, as it may become a prey to vulnerability of every kind and provenance. But it's true it's a question of human quality, of good sense and intelligence."

"Everything depends on what you mean by quality. My grandfather used to say that he had none. He refused to see himself confined in a restricted vision of life. A one-dimensional

life with a single truth that quickly resembles a form of blindness. To have many truths and subject them to checks is much better than having only one truth. What is necessary is to want it and to want to improve it."

"Perhaps it's true. I too tend to define myself as a man without qualities."

"If you want to help me with the Centre of certainty you are welcome."

Night had fallen and someone had lit the lights in the veranda of the house on chemin des Grangettes (nr. 29 to be exact).

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

It is there that we can even now imagine Robert Musil still walking around, perhaps pleased with the developments of the 21st Century which he perceived in vision long before they became a reality.

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- articles and papers solicited from Fellows or from knowledgeable experts who are members of academies and associations having a fraternal and cooperative relationship with the World Academy;

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