



AUTUMN 1994

Workshop Summaries by Harlan Cleveland and Walter Truett Anderson

Introduction

The 1994 Assembly of the World Academy of Art and Science, titled **The Governance of Diversity**, will be held in Minneapolis, Minnesota, beginning the evening of Wednesday, September 28, and ending Saturday noon, October 1st.

Four preparatory workshops were organized, cooperating with other organizations and attended by World Academy Fellows and invited international thinkers.

Their purpose, like the Assembly's, was to diagnose, clarify, and prescribe for the "new world disorder" that has emerged in the post-Cold War years, and to consider how it might be possible to reconcile three global forces -- which we called the "triple dilemma" and nicknamed the "trilemma" -- that now seem to be on collision course with one another.

These three forces, good trends in themselves, are demands for the autonomy and integrity of diverse cultures, demands for the rights of

individual human beings, and demands for greater opportunities to participate in the development of a global economy and a global society.

In the following pages we have summarized our reports on the four workshops that took place successively (from October 1993 to June 1994) in Buffalo, NY (USA), Paris (France), Bolinas (near San Francisco) USA, and Mangalia, on the Black Sea coast of Romania.

As we approach the start of a new millennium, the idea of thinking comprehensively about global issues, about "the situation as a whole," no longer seems so exotic as it did when the World Academy came into being. Now there are many nongovernmental organizations with global scopes and mandates. The familiar slogan -- "think globally, act locally" -- has achieved a broad acceptance.

The resulting thinking and action are, however, still astonishingly difficult. The global/local boundary has blurred;

we seem to have to act locally and globally at the same time, think globally and locally in an integrative framework.

Globalization is highly visible, some of its trends readily measurable. It is nevertheless a bundle of surprises, a revolutionary, unpredictable, uncontrollable, emergent fact of life and work for each of us.

The globalizing world, as each of our 1993-94 workshops rediscovered, is the world we live in -- our home, our society, our challenge to confront, our mystery to unravel.

And the central mystery has to do with how human societies will protect the dignity of individuals and honor cultural diversity while taking full advantage of the globalizing trends which the relentless spread of knowledge -- powered by modern information technologies -- makes at once possible and inevitable.

This is what we will think hard about at the World Academy's 1994 Assembly.

THE WORLD ACADEMY

The World Academy of Art and Science is a non-official network of not more than 500 individual Fellows from diverse cultures, nationalities, and intellectual disciplines, "chosen for eminence in art, the natural and social sciences, and the humanities." Its mandate is to focus on "the social consequences and political implications of knowledge" and to "discuss the vital problems of

humankind, independent of political boundaries or limits."

Since its inception in 1960, the World Academy has organized major conferences around topics of global import. Examples are meetings (and resulting publications) on "Global Impacts of Applied Microbiology" (Stockholm, 1963), "Conflict Resolution and World Education"

(Rome, 1965), "Environment and Society in Transition" (New York City, 1970), "Bioresources for Development" (Houston, Texas, 1978), "Art, Science, and Technology in the 20th Century" (Paris, 1985), "300 Years After Newton" (Lisbon, 1987), and "Art and Science" (Vinci, Italy, 1992). The theme for the September 1994 Assembly (in Minneapolis, USA) is **The Governance of Diversity**.



Report From Buffalo

The first workshop took place in Buffalo, New York, from 7th to 10th October 1993 and was organized and hosted by Professor Magda Cordell McHale, FWAAS, Director of the Center for Integrative Studies, School of Architecture and Planning at Buffalo, assisted by Donna Hutchison. It dealt with "Globalization"

Globalization

The lively discussion touched off by this charge ranged very widely. But its centerpiece was globalization, brought about quite suddenly by modern information science and new technologies of information and communication.

The information and communications revolution has already transformed the world -- changed the nature of war and of peace, torqued the patterns of economic competition and cooperation, enhanced the prospects for development with fairness, made it possible and therefore necessary to think about more and more issues in global perspective.

The workshop's focus came to be the **implications of globalization**: for the rights and obligations of citizenship, for worldwide "generation gaps," for access to information and the synthesis of knowledge, for the global increase in the movement of all other kinds of life forms brought about by human activity, and for cultural change and ethical standards in a civilized world.

Global citizenship

Some idealists in the past have described themselves as "citizens of the world." Nowadays a good many millions of people are *de facto* global citizens who travel, communicate, and do business around the world. There are even more stay-at-homes who reach out to "foreign" cultures for a diversity of stories, cuisines, arts, religious experiences, scientific insights, and new technologies, to increase the variety in their own life and work.

At the same time many other people, often with no cosmopolitan aspirations,

are thrust into global citizenship by the process of globalization -- such as the information flows that pique human curiosity and change human ambitions, and the conflicts that displace people from their homes.

Learning about the conditions and obligations of global citizenship has quite suddenly become a necessity for people in every culture, every occupation, every nation.

Global movement of people

Human mobility is at an all-time high, and so is controversy about it. In our mixed-up world there is really no such thing as a "pure" ethnicity or culture. Yet one of the most explosive issues of our time is the current wave of anti-immigration sentiment. It reflects the tension between many people's desire to maintain the familiar cultural and ethnic contours of "their own" societies, and the desire of people on the move, on purpose or by accident, to find better economic opportunities, greater cultural tolerance, and more political freedom.

On this subject -- "the other population problem" -- most of our inherited doctrines, concepts, and definitions seem to have withered away. For example, the traditional distinctions between persons forced to leave their homes on account of political persecution, civil conflict, "ethnic cleansing," poverty without prospects, ecological destruction, and natural disasters are increasingly blurred.

Some participants in the Buffalo workshop favored deliberate progress toward an "open borders" world -- to be achieved through gradual review and harmonization of national immigration policies everywhere, and through recognition of freedom of movement as a human right. Other participants warned of the catastrophic consequences of massive migrations and the likelihood of violent political reaction against them.

To explore new ways of thinking about human mobility, to find ways to

reconcile the protective instincts of established nations with the population dynamics of globalization, seems clearly a valuable service that the World Academy could offer to a restless world.

Global poverty and development

Poverty has always been a condition, the consequence of systematic discrimination in every society against its poorest citizens. A "right" not to be poor is implicit in the Universal Declaration, and in current proposals for guaranteed income, for universal literacy, for universal access to information about family planning and contraceptive devices, for converting international debt into local-currency aid.

International recognition of a human obligation to help the most needy has produced, over nearly half a century, a variety of programs for development assistance. These have been limited in their achievement by the pile-up of debt obligations and the failure of aid programs effectively to tie their benefactions to changes in "domestic" policies that keep the poor in poverty.

The political support for "foreign aid" has consequently waned in the wealthier countries, as their citizens also face lowered economic expectations for their own wealth creation.

A fresh attack on poverty worldwide is essential to security, in rich countries and poor countries alike. But such a push is not, just now, high on the global agenda.

Global generation gap

Cultural change is clearly linked to the life-experiences and maturity of individuals. In one sense there are in the world three different cultures divided by age: people who lived through World War II and its creative aftermath; the middle-aged postwar "baby boomers" now coming to position and power; and contemporary youth, more comfortable with images than with words as a method of

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The Buffalo Workshop (from p.2)

expression and a means of understanding the world they are inheriting.

Each generation has its own sensibilities, its own political and social commitments and loyalties. Any effort to reconcile cultural identities with individual rights and global opportunities will need to take the "global generation gaps" into account.

Global information and communication

Telephone service is being installed and improved in every part of the world; new television networks are making political geography less a barrier to seeing and learning; new communications inventions and business mergers promise to create worldwide interactive multi-media systems.

Each new technological change alters the conditions both for people's access to information for themselves and for people's access to the platforms from which information is communicated to others.

The new communication systems make global studies both possible and necessary. But for education in global perspective, concepts and curricula lag, as usual, behind the technologies available to deliver them. There is now a need, participants in the Buffalo workshop suggested, for "a pedagogy of ecological competence" and learnings about cultural diversity that would reinforce attitudes of tolerance in a multicultural world.

Biological globalization

The explosion of human mobility is paralleled by an astonishing increase in the movement of all other kinds of life forms. This other migration is partly accidental and partly deliberate, partly legal and partly illegal, but mostly the consequence of human acts and ambitions. It is a byproduct of many activities, from food production to scientific research to zookeeping to home gardening, changing in unexamined ways the balance of he-

redity and heritage in the living world.

In the Buffalo workshop, we identified this as a "condition" rather than as a "problem." Yet the condition gives rise to many problems, such as illegal trade in endangered species, cross-border invasions of exotic pests and predators, and global epidemics such as AIDS.

Other aspects of globalization -- economic, political, cultural -- are now fairly widely known, if not completely understood. But the extent of biological globalization is hardly known at all outside of scientific circles.

Global cultural change

Even more impressive than the surge of mobility in the bioworld is the explosive mobility of ideas and images. One result of modern communications technologies is that all cultures appear to be undergoing rapid change -- which includes much more creative adaptation and borrowing from one another. At the same time, more and more elements of a "global culture" are becoming evident.

Many people are attempting to define this global culture, some prescribing desirable values, beliefs, myths, and rituals for it. There is a fear that global culture will lead to a bland homogenization of all cultures, or that it will be a device for imposing on weaker societies the declared values of stronger societies. But there are parallel hopes as well; that a global culture will emerge as the vehicle of spreading support for democracy, human rights, and environmental sanity.

A "global ethic"?

A strong case can be made for a new effort to derive from the world's great religious and moral philosophies a common basis for a global code of ethics that leaves plenty of room for cultural diversity. The World Academy would do well to join in such an enterprise.

Report From Paris

On October 28 and 29, 1993, a World Academy workshop was convened in Paris, co-sponsored by the Gulbenkian Foundation and the Club of Lisbon, organized by Dr. Horácio P.R.C. Menano and Dr. João Caraça. This workshop examined in tandem the World Academy's globalization agenda and a draft Club of Lisbon report on "The Limits to Competition."

Early in the session, a 1992 comment by Vaclav Havel was suggested as context for the workshop:

"As the Eighties became the Nineties, the whole Second World, as it used to be known, exploded and, in a rather frenzied fashion, collapsed in upon itself. In its place, a crater has suddenly opened up before the eyes of the astonished world, one that is now spewing forth a lava of post-communist surprises. Mixed up in this lava, we will find a long-forgotten history coming back to haunt us, a history full of thousands of economic, social, ethical, ethnic, territorial, cultural and political problems that remained latent and unnoticed under the surface of totalitarian boredom."

Among the "surprises" discussed were four kinds of globalization, three transformative trends, and a fresh way of thinking about competitiveness as a central principle of business and governance. The discussion ramified to focus on several related issues.

1. Four globalizations.

We are being invaded by the world. Globalization -- the spread of networks of exchange, transportation, and communication; the collapse of boundaries that once isolated communities, economies, nations -- is the overriding phenomenon of our time.

- The most noticeable, best-documented dimension of globalization is the economic one: expanding trade, expanding reach of transnational business, opening-up of new markets, strenuous international competition. The technologies facilitate exchange of services on a global scale. Especially spectacular is the globalization of finance: the global, 24-hour network of currency exchange that dilutes the power of governments to control the value of their currencies.

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- Concurrently there is political globalization: a complex of fresh institutions, movements, causes, interests, issues. The post-Cold War years are massively reorienting intergovernmental organizations, international nongovernments, and internationally-recognized states. The number of states continues to grow. Democratic institutions grow up -- precariously but with astonishing speed in new environments.

- Cultural globalization is also taking place. Words, concepts, images, myths, norms, rituals, and artistic creations become familiar to peoples everywhere. The homogenization of cultures into a single gray uniformity -- feared and predicted -- does not seem to be happening, though the ubiquity of some Western pop icons (rock and rap music, blue jeans and t-shirts) is evident. New cultural forms are being invented.

- Biological globalization has been under way since the earliest beginnings of human civilization: when people move, other life forms always move with them, ecosystems are always transformed. Today the movement of plants and animals, insects and microorganisms, is escalating along with human communication and mobility. As cities become more cosmopolitan and pluralistic, so, it seems, do all ecosystems.

Technological progress appears to be driving each type of globalization. It's an agent of revolutionary change.

As globalization becomes the overriding phenomenon of our time, it also becomes the overriding political issue. For every globalizing force there are counter-forces and counter-measures: protectionism against economic globalization, isolationism and separatism against political globalization, fundamentalism against cultural globalization, quarantines and Green "bio-regional" mystique against biological globalization

2. Three transformations.

The global mutations are due to the

emergence of *immaterial* factors as the dominant forces in modern society. This is the first time since the Neolithic era that large-scale change is *not* related to energy. The prospect is basically good news -- machines replacing routinized human labor, economic growth without increased energy use. But it is producing three transformations, producing not a new crisis but new norms.

- The mutation we call "globalization" is linked to deregulation of business, to liberalization of trade, and especially to finance. Because transactions expressed in money can flow so swiftly around the world, production is no longer managed by the logic of manufacturing but by the logic of finance. *Where* something is produced is of declining importance.

- Globalization produces a "vicious circle" in which most gains in productivity are achieved by reducing employment. The logic of the system is to increase profits by laying off workers -- that is, by "social exclusion." That logic pushes governments towards policies of guaranteed income, reduced hours of work and sharing of the necessary work by more workers.

The connection between economic decisions and national "policies" becomes more tenuous. Information, the increasingly dominant resource, is not like other factors of production; it improves productivity on global levels. The distribution between capital and labor becomes blurred, and concepts such as "marginal cost" become less useful. "If national governments get together, what can they discuss?"

If accelerating the rate of growth doesn't mean more employment, the question is no longer "growth vs. no-growth." The question is, "What *kind* of growth?"

- The information economy induces also an **organizational transformation**. Networks work better than hierarchies. A networked economy can disperse production functions in smaller units.

Processing and analyzing information from many places makes it possible to disperse production in many places.

More and more power is moving to global networks. It will be important to match economic power with political power that has the same range and reach.

3. The nature of competition.

In all domains, it seems, there is a strong feeling that competition is a panacea. In particular the newest converts to competition carry it too far, finding that the best way to avoid responsibility for anything is to "leave it to the market."

The Group of Lisbon, holding a wide spectrum of views, all agree that there are **limits to competition** as the central principle of political economy.

It's not clear that **competition** and **democracy** necessarily go together. Current developments in East Asia bear witness. Vietnam frustrated the United States militarily, yet seems to be adopting American economic philosophy. "The driving new force of China" points to a similar paradox.

Competition among **firms** must be distinguished from competition among **countries**. As the interests of competing firms join the interests of competing countries, the result is anti-market moves: protectionism, "technonationalism," bilateralism intended to exclude third countries.

Markets have the merit of liberating individual dynamism. By multiplying decision centers, markets can produce an extraordinary degree of stability. But markets can only satisfy **demands**, not **needs**; they do not produce an "optimum distribution" that is socially acceptable. And market systems have practical limits: Labor, free to organize, won't accept lower wages. Discount rates don't take account of intergenerational equity.

In order to defend competition, limits

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must be put on it. For market competition to work, governments need to cooperate.

4. Related themes.

Around the edges of these major themes, the workshop discussed some striking new features of the current international scene:

- **New actors.** The world envisaged by the UN's founders consisted mostly of states, and intergovernmental agencies. But the new world is full of "heavy hitters" from the private sector -- executives of international firms, leaders of nongovernments, the international scientific community -- with impressive reach and influence.

- The idea of a **global civil society** is growing fast. Protecting diversity, meeting basic needs, preserving environmental resources, taking account of future generations, assuring mutual recognition and fruitful exchanges between cultures -- all these require not competition but collaboration.

- **The media** provide strong new voices on the world stage. The global spread of radio and television, and the emergence of some journals and newspapers with a global reach, make the communications industry a major player in, not just a reporter of, world politics, economy, and culture.

- **Cities** are getting too big to protect their citizens and visitors from dirt, danger, crime, and the breakup of family life. They have developed this way as a consequence of modern technologies, but some new communication technologies could help shrink cities' size without reducing their relevance.

- **The Triad** is what the Group of Lisbon calls the world's industrialized countries. Markets in the "triadic countries" are not expanding; the Triad's motivation must be that expansion in the developing world is the key to their own expanding opportunities. Some new technologies can leapfrog older ones in developing

countries; media conglomerates and the finance sector are likely to show strong growth; transportation by ship and rail may be due for revival.

- A major need is **more dialogue between cultures**, both to make diversity safer and to protect civil society from fracturing along cultural lines.

- **The United Nations' role** is changing fast, but not nearly fast enough to stay ahead of the globalization trend. (The Secretary General spends 80% of his time on peacekeeping; the global environment is still treated with national plans; the population explosion is still explosive.) There is still a wide gap between the UN's stated goals and its resources (its "capacity to act"); what's needed above all is "a stronger sense of objects and means."

Report from Bolinas

The third workshop entitled "**Global Governance in a Turbulent World**" was cosponsored by The Meridian International Institute and was hosted February 4-6, 1994, by the Commonwealth Conference Center in Bolinas, California. It was organized and chaired by **Walter Truett Anderson**, President of the American Division of the World Academy and Vice President of The Meridian.

Building on the two prior workshops, in Buffalo, NY, and in Paris, the focus at Bolinas was on what the rapid and pervasive globalization is doing to change the "problematique" that many scholars and international commissions have been trying to describe, and prescribe for, in recent years.

Five summaries of current efforts to think about "global governance" were discussed:

1. Global governance, said Professor James Rosenau, is a lot of governmental and nongovernmental activities that occur in local places, which constitute such order as there is in world affairs. In our turbulent, high-com-

plexity, high-dynamism era, a world-wide "skill revolution" means that many healthy adult citizens everywhere are more able than their grandparents were to construct scenarios about where they fit in the world. States are still important, but the "multi-centric world" of "sovereignty-free" nongovernmental actors interacts (competes *and* cooperates) with the state-centered world. Authority structures are everywhere in crisis, threatened by the willingness of people to engage in collective action.

2. In a retrospective analysis of the Brundtland Commission, its secretary general James MacNeill, said "we have now come to doubt" its basic assumption that states, acting together, "have their hands on levers that are connected to the real world." The Earth summit (June 1992) was also committed to this idea, but states turned out to be unable or unwilling to address issues such as population growth, global warming, and biodiversity. New coalitions -- "carbon states," "contrary scientists," "anti-environment NGOs" -- were empowered by the Information Revolution; the computer chip had "the effect of shifting power from nation-states to individuals, scientific institutes, industries, you name it." How do we frame policy prescriptions in ways that meet these new conditions?

3. João Caraça described the work of the Group of Lisbon on a report called *The Limits to Competition* (to be published later in 1994). The Group, drawn from the world's developed "North," concludes that competitiveness, pushed to its extreme, works against free markets. Competition among enterprises is productive, but competition between states is unproductive. A "global civil society" is emerging. The Group sees four basic social contracts as the glue to hold it together: (a) a "having" contract about such basic needs as water, (b) an "Earth" contract about the global environment, (c) a "democratic" contract about governance, and (d) a "cultural" contract that reconciles identity with community.

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4. Global governance options are not limited, said Michael Clough (consultant to the Commission on Global Governance), to "international cooperation" or "centralized rule-making." A third option is a system with room for multiple decision-making centers. There is an increase in the ranges of *types* of organization, and a parallel growth in the *numbers*, the density of organizations. At the same time, the *character* of organizations is changing, as the "skill revolution" transforms how individuals participate.

5. The more matters are turbulent, said Yehezkel Dror, who is writing a report *On the Capacity to Govern* for The Club of Rome, the more they require us to design for the unknown. A system of governance will try to avoid the bad (ecological collapse, doomsday-equipped crazy states), which is comparatively easy; achieve the good, such as the globalization of human rights, which is harder but conceivable; and consider what futures are good or bad, which will engage peoples and their leaders in very difficult choices about equity, justice, and morality.

"Globalization" comprises at least eight related and interacting trends. The most obvious is **economic** -- global movements of information, money, services, commodities, manufactures, and services; the international exchange of money; the explosion of electronic messages; the global reach of even small enterprises. A parallel **political** globalization is evident in the growing complexity of international regimes, the rising number of "nongovernments" in international politics, and the rapid spread of universal ideas (such as human rights or the perception of environmental threats). More and more **cultural** messages -- symbols, songs and slogans -- achieve a global resonance; even culturally distinctive art and artifacts (e.g., ethnic cuisine) are widely reproduced. There is a **biological** globalization, with infectious diseases and all manner of biological organisms and genetic resources in motion.

Human migration is global. Young people in many scattered places converge in their tastes, interests, and means of communication. **Inequity** is global too: a shared domination of the affluent elite, a shared resentment of the disadvantaged poor. And a global "civil society" is emerging as increasing numbers of people and their leaders act (on environmental issues, for example) as citizens of the planet.

Three disequilibria are evident: a global economy not matched by a global "public sector;" global natural systems affected more by human behavior than anything else (for the first time in world history); and conscious systems unaware of unconscious systems.

There is, of course, resistance to globalization and backlash to its effects: "ethnic cleansing" and religious fundamentalism are examples both current and choice. Each of the great religions asserts universal truths and doctrines, yet some adherents act as counterforce to the globalizing trend -- even using the global media to advertise terrorist acts.

The global challenge to governance is to create societies where, in John Gardner's phrase, wholeness can incorporate diversity.

Report from Mangalia

The fourth and final workshop was convened by Dr. Mircea Malitza, co-sponsored by the Black Sea University, and held in Mangalia, Romania from June 10 to 12, 1994.

Building on the prior workshops made it possible and necessary to sharpen the focus on cultural issues in a world, and a region, where many cultures suddenly freed from the constraints of the Cold War are seeking more elbow room, even as trends toward globalization gain momentum in nearly every domain. The theme therefore selected for this workshop was "Cultural Identity and the Requirements of Civilization."

Uses and Abuses of Cultural Identity
In the disordered world after the multiple revolutions of 1989 ("this post-most-anything time," one participant called it), the collision of cultures with global trends is everywhere in evidence.

Ethnic nations, fragmented faiths, transnational business, and professional groups find both their inward loyalties and their international liaisons leading them to question the political structure (states, alliances, conventions, traditions of discrimination) by which the world is still, if tenuously, organized. The results are sometimes symbolic caricatures ("in Rome, can a Moslem minaret be built taller than St. Peter's dome?") and sometimes tragedy, as in the "broken mosaic" that used to be Yugoslavia.

More people are moving this year than ever before in world history -- driven by the fear of guns or the ambition for more butter. This more mobile world multiplies the opportunities for individuals to develop "multiple personalities," "collages" of identities, plural loyalties to overlapping groups. Women especially may be more adapted to filling different roles at the same time: their common experience in managing a family enables them "to operate without a rigid, complicated structure."

Though no culture is or can be complete in itself, many millions of people in this time of uncertainty and insecurity believe that their best haven of certainty and security is a *group* based on ethnic similarity, a common faith, economic interest, or political likemindedness. Societies based on fear of outsiders tend toward "totalitarian" governance ("villages are totalitarian," said one participant), emphasizing culture "beyond the limits." ("The ultimate consequence of 'cultural identity' is Hutus and Tutsis murdering each other.")

The fear that drives people to cleave to "primordial loyalties" makes it corre-

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spondingly harder for them to learn behaviors consistent with tolerance of others who may be guided by different faiths and loyalties. "To say that you're ready to *die* for cultural identity means that you're also ready to *kill* for cultural identity." Fear also makes it harder for individuals to adapt to the tumbling changes (symbolized by the computer's marriage to the telephone) which seem to be the law of life on this planet at this season.

Tribes and their Integration

Isolating oneself by clinging to one's tribe is not a stable condition; these days, it's highly *unstable*. Differences in birthrates and pressures to move will continue to mix populations together. (In the Mediterranean area, far more people are migrating from south to north than from north to south; one estimate figures the potential ratio at 64 to 1.) So "ethnic purity" isn't going to happen, even by forcible "cleansing."

Besides, "cultures" keep redefining themselves by mixing and matching with other cultures -- not only through getting to know people who look, act, and believe differently but through exposure in a more open electronic world to new faiths and fashions, new lifestyles, work methods, technologies, clothing, and cuisines.

The early stages of every realization of "cultural identity," every assertion of a newfound "right" to be different, does create a distinct group marked by ethnic aspect ("black is beautiful"), gender ("women's lib"), religion ("chosen people"), or status as a political minority. But when members of a group insisting on the group's difference establish their own personal right to be different, they begin to be treated individually as equals, then tend to integrate with more inclusive communities.

Traditions of separateness and discrimination are often persistent. But they are never permanent, immutable; the recent history of South Africa bears

witness. Before the fighting in what used to be Yugoslavia, the most tolerant people in that part of the world were seen to be the Serbs, Croats, and Moslems living together in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most intolerant have been "people acting as part of a machine" -- German occupiers half a century ago, and in recent years "Serbs trying to become a machine."

The problem, then, is not "culture," it's cultural overenthusiasm. Its explosive potential is such that without the moderating influence (the "fuel rods") of civil society, cultural loyalties have the makings of a runaway bomb. What's needed is the counterweight, the "heavy water," of wider views, regional variety, global perspectives, more "universal" ideas.

Yet if "culture" played no role, society could too easily return to totalitarian patterns. Post-communist societies, said a resident of one of them, have experienced a loss of equilibrium, a kind of "culture shock" from the clash of (a) traditional cultures, (b) a nostalgia for stability ("Soviet culture"), and (c) new influences from outside. What's needed is cultural richness without cultural dominance, but with the moderating influence of inter-cultural respect and tolerance.

With the globalization tide running strong, is a "global tribe" emerging? Not yet, at least. Telecommunication creates more diversity, and also heightens awareness of diversity and the dilemmas and dichotomies to which it gives rise. But the worldwide real-time networks ("place-less societies") made possible by modern information technology are producing new kinds of groups, with people less fettered by geography and necessarily more tolerant of diversity.

"Culture" and "Civilization"

We have inherited a fuzzy vocabulary that sometimes treats "culture" as a synonym of "civilization." In the Mangalia workshop, we experimented with an alternative construct:

In this construct, **civilization** is what's universal -- values, ideas and practices that are in general currency everywhere, either because they are viewed as objectively "true" or because they are accepted pragmatically as useful in the existing circumstances. These offer the promise of weaving together a *civitas* of universal laws and rules, becoming the basis for "global civil society." What is sometimes called "management culture" appears to be achieving this kind of universal acceptance, hence becoming a part of global "civilization."

Culture is what's subjective -- the substance and symbols of community, the basic human need for a sense of belonging, the pride and fears that are shared with an in-group.

In this contrast, "culture" has the longer, "civilization" the shorter, time-constant. But both are moving targets, subject to continuous change. The most pervasive changes in our time seem to be brought about by the spread of knowledge facilitated by information technologies.

(Is a "European identity" emerging? It will require more respect for differences, more capacity for cultural co-operation without uniformity, than is yet possible in Western Europe. And the prospective addition to the mix of more different kinds of Europeans from the central and eastern parts of the continent seems likely to retard further the shared sense of community that further "European integration" would require.)

The distortions of "culture" come especially from insistence on the *rights* of groups and categories of people, with little attention to duties, obligations, responsibilities. One such distortion is evident in the rapid growth of populations and in the accelerating mobility of people, sometimes in large groups.

"Civilization" will be built by cooperation and compassion, a social cli-

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Report from Mangalia (*from pg. 7*)
mate in which people in different groups can deal with each other in ways that respect their cultural differences. "The puzzle is how to be different together."

Civilization is rooted in compromise -- between the idea of a democratic state and a strong state, where citizens need both; between a free market economy and a caring economy, between "open" and "closed" processes, between horizontal and vertical relationships, between "active" and "passive" citizenship. The viable answer in each case is "some of both." For example, no citizen can be expected to be active in all domains, but every citizen can be active in *some* domain. Free enterprise can flourish only in an environment of "social control" that makes sure the freedom is relatively fair.

"Civil Society"

There is no "ideal" civil society to which we can all aspire. We should, indeed, beware of new kinds of dogmatism. But a trend is clearly evident that gives clues to the future of civil society, globally and in units large and small. That trend is the development of networks. It is now quite possible to build a modern organization without a heavy overhead staff in a building somewhere. (The World Academy itself is an illustrative microcosm).

"You understand civil society when you don't have it." Civil society consists of many structures and networks, not very dependent on public authority for their charters or their funding, increasingly taking on functions that used to be considered the responsibility of national governments. One revealing trend is the multiplication of new players in every domain.

Many of these "nongovernments," such as those concerned with business and finance, science, women, population, and the environment, have become effective users of modern information technologies, and are providing more and more of the policy

initiative both inside countries and in world affairs.

The international exchange of money is remarkably efficient, daily moving more than a trillion dollars' worth of money among countries. Yet it is literally true that no one is in charge of the system that makes this happen. Recently, the puny efforts of governments to control monetary swings by buying and selling currencies have served only to demonstrate their incapacity to control them.

In preparations for the upcoming World Population Conference, "the voices of NGO's are large, of governments small."

In Romania after Ceaucescu, there are 25 nongovernmental organizations focusing on women.

An international group of biologists has developed a code of ethics for biotechnology.

A convention of Nobel Laureates is drafting a Charter of Human Duties.

There is even talk of adding to the UN's structure a General Assembly of nongovernmental organizations.

And so on . . . thousands of examples could be cited.

In these circumstances "we can't await great decisions by governments and international organizations." In world affairs the multidimensional political/economic/cultural traffic will be generated in multiple initiatives from many directions. The premium will be on developing very large numbers of leaders (most of them not in formal positions), leaders able to project their vision, leaders anxious to keep on learning as the world changes.

It is characteristic of "civil society" that change occurs by setting up new organizations, not reorganizing old ones. The global arrangements, now half a century old, that gave a semblance of world order after the Second

World War were created with "architectural metaphors." Nowadays we need eco-systems thinking, such as Ilya Prigogine's concept of "self-organizing systems" -- metaphors not from mechanics but from electronics, biology and chemistry ("complex reactions in a liquid solution"), to describe the nature of our increasingly networked world.

A key to this new, more open, world is information technology. If young people are its most "natural users," a new principle of "natural selection" may be operating between generations. In infotech, ends and means coalesce: "Institutions are formed by communication itself;" communities are developing as communications linkages (and may in time be financed by some kind of "bit tax"). This trend may have surprising effects: in recent Italian politics, the very openness of communication made possible repetitive messages carried by mass media -- a form of power that led to a major shift in political leadership.

In developing countries, "civil society" will have more difficulty emerging; lags in education and awareness, and in the acquisition of information and communication skills, retard the critical kinds of growth, inhibiting the needed independence of personal initiative.

But information, the resource that expands as it's used, is much more accessible to people anywhere (once educated) than resources such as land, minerals, and energy which used to be the key sources of wealth. In the short run, the people who best understand information flows and communication techniques are bound to have a head start; but it may now be easier for others to catch up in a hurry than it ever was before in world history.

Large megaprojects, made possible by global information technologies, may hasten the emergence of a "global civil society." In the new world, "the glue that will hold us together comes not so much from culture as from common projects based on uncommon vision."